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Introduction
Few subjects in American antitrust law have undergone as many
changes and generated as much debate among economists and
lawyers as the regulation of vertical arrangements.1 Because these
arrangements often restrain the freedom of firms to determine their
own resale prices or distribution strategies, it has been accepted for
some time that a rigorous antitrust policy is necessary, in this area, to
maintain competition.2
It was not until the 1960s that a group of economists and lawyers
called the "Chicago School" began to question this conventional
wisdom.3 They argued that a manufacturer is unlikely to use
restrictive vertical arrangements for anticompetitive purposes,
because those arrangements tend to increase distributors' market
power or decrease consumers' demand for the manufacturer's
product and, therefore, work against the manufacturer's self-interest.4
Thus, when those arrangements are observed, more frequently than
not they are imposed by the manufacturer with reasonable business
justifications.5  For example, consider minimum resale price
maintenance between a manufacturer and its dealers. Once a
manufacturer's product is sold to dealers at a wholesale price with a
fixed margin, the manufacturer's profits are proportional to the
1. Alan A. Fisher & Richard Sciacca, An Economic Analysis of Vertical Merger
Enforcement Policy, 6 RES. ON L. & ECON. 1, 3 (1984)("Of all areas in antitrust, the
differences between the legal interpretation and economic analysis seem greatest with
respect to vertical relationships (both mergers and vertical restraints)."); John S. McGee
& Lowell R. Bassett, Vertical Integration Revisited, 19 J.L. & ECON. 17, 18 (1976)("It
appears that the evolution of economic theories about vertical integration has led
alternately from deepest fog into brief patches of sunlight, thence plunging again into
gloom and confusion.").
2. See generally Robert Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters: The No-Frills Case for a
Per Se Rule Against Vertical Price Fixing, 71 GEO. LJ. 1487, 1488-94 (1983)(presenting
arguments in support of traditional per se standard with respect to vertical restraints).
3. Among them, Robert Bork, Richard Posner, and Lester Telser are the best known.
For the arguments for which these authors are known, see generally ROBERT H. BORK,
THE ANTrrRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978); RICHARD A.
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976) [hereinafter POSNER,
ANTITRUST LAW]; Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L.
& ECON. 86 (1960). According to Bork, many of these scholars were influenced by the
teaching of Aaron Director at University of Chicago Law School. See BORK, supra at ix.
For a brief presentation of many of Director's views on antitrust, see generally Aaron
Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 Nw. U. L. REV. 281
(1956). On the Chicago School, see generally Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of
Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 925 (1979).
4. See BORK, supra note 3, at 290-98; POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 3, at
148-50 (discussing retail price maintenance), 160-62 (discussing exclusive territories), 165.
5. BORK, supra note 3, at 290-98.
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quantities demanded in the final market. Therefore, it is somewhat
counter-intuitive, if not self-defeating, for a manufacturer to prohibit
its dealers from engaging in price cutting, when such competition
tends to increase overall sales of its product. According to the
Chicago School, explanations other than the exploitation of market
power must exist to explain why a manufacturer would willingly
adopt a distribution arrangement that puts it at a competitive
disadvantage. For example, Lester Telser, in his widely discussed
article, suggests that a manufacturer uses resale price maintenance to
avoid free-riding behavior among distributors.6 That is, in the
absence of a restraint on price discounts, a distributor has a strong
incentive to take advantage of any pre-sale services provided by its
competitors to attract potential customers without having to bear the
costs of service provision. If such an outlook is prevalent among
distributors, no service will be provided and the manufacturer may
suffer losses if pre-sale services are deemed necessary for its
customers.
7
The procompetitive theories advocated by the Chicago School
have not only changed conventional judicial thinking about vertical
restrictive arrangements, 8 but have also improved our understanding
of the competitive strategies employed in product distribution.9
Recent developments in economic theory have in several respects
revised and expanded the Chicagoans' theme to include new elements
in a more general analytical framework. 10 Although debate on the
6. See, e.g., Telser, supra note 3, at 91-95.
7. For a detailed discussion of the free-riding hypothesis, see infra Part VI.B.
8. The Chicago School influence is obvious in the economic rationales provided in
several recent Supreme Court antitrust decisions. See, e.g., Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA
Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 343 n.13, 345 (1990); Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec.
Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 729-30 n.3, 730-31 n.4 (1988); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,589,591-92 n.15, 594-95 (1986); Continental T.V., Inc. v. G.T.E.
Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54-56 (1977). See also Frank H. Easterbrook, Ignorance and
Antitrust, in ANTITRUST, INNOVATION AND COMPETITIVENESS 119, 119 (Thomas M.
Jorde & David J. Teece eds., 1992)("[Judges] have accepted the proposition that antitrust
policy divorced from economics would be a calamity, and an antitrust policy conjoined
with some inconsistent social policy would be incoherent and ineffectual."(citation
omitted)); William H. Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust:
Characterization, Antitrust Injury and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REV. 1221, 1226
(1989)(" [Chicago models] have become a shared conceptual basis for decision in antitrust
cases for a substantial part of the federal judiciary.").
9. Most of the modem economic analyses of vertical control methods take the
Chicago School analyses as a starting point. See, e.g., ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L.
KASERMAN, ANTITRUST EcONOMICS 349-55 (1985)(surveying the economic literature on
minimum resale price maintenance, starting with the Telser analysis).
10. See, e.g., Michael L. Katz, Vertical Contractual Relations, in 1 HANDBOOK OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 655 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds.,
1989) (presenting a theoretical analysis of vertical contracts). In addition to the theoretical
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extent to which those theories are applicable still continues, the
center of the debate today focuses not so much on their theoretical
validity as the normative suggestion that all types of vertical
arrangements be treated as per se legal under the antitrust laws.' It
would be a stretch to say that the Chicago School and its progeny will
eventually lead the courts to conclude that vertical arrangements are
always beneficial to market competition. But by and large, they have
reshaped antitrust jurisprudence in this area and will continue to play
a part in forming the theoretical basis of court decisions.
In this paper, we survey procompetitive theories of vertical
arrangements, and examine how these theories could be organized to
aid interpretation of antitrust law. Given the ever-expanding body of
literature in this area, this is a daunting task which we cannot hope to
complete in a single article. Nevertheless, we find a market-structure-
based survey a helpful approach.' 2 We have introduced various
procompetitive theories in connection with the market structures in
which they are likely to be applicable, though we do not claim they
could only operate within a specific market context. Our approach
work reflected in the Katz survey, several scholars have taken a more policy-oriented
approach toward expanding the Chicago framework. For example, Professor Steven
Salop has argued in several articles that many vertical restrictions could be used
strategically to increase the costs of competitors. See Steven C. Salop & David T.
Scheffman, Raising Rivals' Costs, 73 AM. ECON. REv. 267 (1983); Thomas G.
Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to
Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE Li. 209, 268 (1986). Another line of policy-oriented
"Post-Chicago" work has stressed the importance of imperfect information in assessing
antitrust policy. See, ag., Richard Craswell, Tying Requirements in Competitive Markets:
The Consumer Protection Issues, 62 B.U. L. REv. 661, 671-81 (1982). For policy-oriented
critiques of the Chicago School, from a "post-Chicago" perspective, see Lawrence A.
Sullivan, Post-Chicago Economics: Economists, Lawyers, Judges, and Enforcement
Officials in a Less Determinate Theoretical World, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 669 (1995); Herbert
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REv. 213 (1985).
11. For the classic argument in favor of per se legality in the area of vertical restraints,
see BORK, supra note 3, at 288-98. Posner, after initially supporting a rule of reason
approach to vertical restraints, came around to Bork's view that per se legality should be
the rule. See Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach.
Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. Cm. L. REV. 1 (1977)(discussing Posner's
initial, cautious, rule-of-reason argument); Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the
Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHL. L. REv. 6
(1981)(discussing Posner's later, more aggressive stance favoring per se legality).
Easterbrook has also moved from a cautious rule-of-reason argument toward favoring
something very close to per se legality. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Maximum
Price Fixing, 48 U. Cm. L. REV. 886 (1981)(stating that the rule of reason should apply to
maximum price fixing); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Thx. L. REV. 1
(1984)(urging courts to adopt "filters" or bright-line rules which avoid finding vertical
restraints unlawful).
12. For a similar though somewhat dated approach, see generally, FREDERICK R.
WARREN-BOULTON, VERTICAL CONTROL OF MARKETS (1978).
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should aid antitrust courts in setting priorities among the factors to be
considered in rule of reason analysis, and provide them a relatively
clear path to follow when analyzing cases under the rule of reason.
Throughout the paper, we use the term "vertical control" to
denote two general types of vertical arrangement-vertical
integration and vertical restraints. Most of the procompetitive
theories are based on a fundamental incentive divergence observed in
the manufacturer-distributor relationship. In a nutshell, when goods
are sold through two markets successively and separately, the
manufacturer and its distributors may have different ideas regarding
the ideal distribution pattern. For example, what appears to be the
optimal price from the perspective of the distributors may be too high
for the manufacturer had it sold the goods directly to customers.
Vertical arrangements are often employed by the manufacturer to
"control" the incentive of the distributor to deviate from the
manufacturer's ideal distribution pattern at the downstream market.
Accordingly, vertical integration might be thought of as a firm's
decision to exercise control over the whole production and
distribution process through acquisition of ownership, internal
expansion, or initial formation.13 Vertical restraints, on the other
hand, denote a market-oriented type of control-usually a discrete
contractual arrangement between two independent firms.14
Specifically, we discuss six types of vertical restraints in this paper:
franchise fee, royalties, resale price maintenance, territorial
restriction, tying, and exclusive dealing.
In general, Ronald Coase's insight on the existence of firms
provides a starting point for understanding why vertical control is
observed in the market. In his classic, The Nature of the Firm,5 Coase
raised and answered the following question: why do firms vertically
13. See Martin K. Perry, Vertical Integration" Determinants and Effects, in 1
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 183, 186-87 (Richard Schmalensee &
Robert D. Willig eds., 1989).
14. Generally, the distinction between vertical integration and vertical restraints may
not be as clear as the one used here. The term "vertical integration" has been applied in
particular by economists to refer to arrangements with dissimilar structural features. For
example, under the definition by Blair and Kaserman, vertical integration refers to the
types of transactions in which "[a] firm transfers internally from one department to
another a commodity which could be sold in the market without major adaptation." With
this definition, they conclude that "[a]ll firms are vertically integrated to some degree ....
[But] [n]o firm is totally vertically integrated." BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 9, at 283-
84 (citation omitted). Alternatively, vertical integration has been used by Tirole rather
broadly to include vertical restraints. According to Tirole, a firm could be labeled as
vertically integrated so long as the firm could "control[ ] (directly or indirectly) all the
decisions made by the vertical structure." JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 170 (1989).
15. R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386,394-95 (1937).
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integrate, rather than use the market, given the efficient market
implied by the model of perfect competition? Coase's argument, put
simply, is that a firm expands when the cost of expansion is less than
that of relying on outsourcing. In the manufacturer-distributor
setting, Coase's theory implies that a manufacturer will choose not to
use a sales agent when doing so is more costly than direct sale.
Two questions follow from this observation. First, what are the
costs associated with use of the market? Second, how can vertical
control be applied to mitigate those costs? We examine these
questions in Parts I and II. In particular, the costs associated with the
principal-agent problem and its resolution through the use of vertical
integration will be addressed. In contrast, Part III applies the analysis
of vertical integration to markets that are not perfectly competitive.
Emphasis will be placed on the economic effects of the successive-
monopoly problem, and how vertical integration can improve welfare.
Parts IV and V focus on showing the equivalence of vertical
integration and various vertical restraints in terms of their ability to
reduce the costs of distribution. In Part IV, we examine how vertical
restraints serve as "substitutes" for vertical integration in reducing
distribution costs in competitive markets. Specifically, we describe
how vertical restraints serve to mitigate the free-riding problem and
to maintain product reputation. Part V is devoted to establishing the
equivalence of vertical integration and vertical restraints in
controlling the successive monopoly problem. From the
manufacturers' perspective, this equivalence or interchangeability is
beneficial when there is a need to control the distributor's incentives,
but vertical integration is prohibitively costly or fails to pass antitrust
law hurdles.
In contrast with the discussion in Parts IV and V, Part VI deals
with the complimentarity of vertical control mechanisms. Given the
equivalence of vertical integration and other contractual restraints as
controlling mechanisms, why is mixed use of these arrangements
more frequently encountered in practice? As the analysis in Part VI
will demonstrate, informational asymmetry and market uncertainty
are the major factors that spur a manufacturer to bundle vertical
integration with other vertical restraints as a package for the
distribution of its products or services.
We close the discussion of complementarity by briefly setting out
the implications of this survey for antitrust doctrine. At the risk of
oversimplifying this project, perhaps the best way to think about the
practical import of this paper is by contrasting it with a rather
simplified version of the Chicago School approach. While the
Chicago School analysis, under the early influence of Director and
March 1999] PROCOMPETITIVE THEORIES
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Bork, has generally suggested a per se legality approach to vertical
control mechanisms,16 that is not the intended or primary implication
of this paper. Our primary aim is to set out the economic
considerations in rule of reason analysis of vertical control
mechanisms. In other words, instead of pointing courts to a particular
conclusion, we have aimed to provide a flashlight, of sorts, for courts
to use in navigating the dark tunnels of the reasonableness inquiry.
On a secondary level, this analysis implies that courts should
adopt a functionally oriented, rule of reason test for vertical control
mechanisms. Antitrust courts have been moving in the direction of
rule of reason analysis in the area of vertical restraints, but they still
have a long way to go before reaching the stage we think appropriate.
Moreover, the rule of reason tests that have been developed in some
areas are for the most part not functionally-oriented, in the sense that
key legal distinctions are not based on a consideration of the
economic function of the vertical control mechanism.
I. Vertical Control in Competitive Markets: Vertical
Integration and the Principal-Agent Dilemma
One of the features of a perfectly competitive market is that firms
will compete based on perfect information.17 Under this assumption,
a manufacturer effortlessly acquires knowledge regarding customer
preferences, and uses that information to adjust its competitive
strategies in order to offer more attractive terms or to provide better
services than its rivals do. Moreover, perfect information enables the
manufacturer to respond to any increase or decrease in market
demand by entering or exiting the market without delay.
To be sure, this assumption may not always hold. In fact, most of
the information necessary for decision making takes time to collect.
When the resources required for information collection are
significant, selling through an independent dealer who is already
operating in the market and is familiar with regional demand
conditions is frequently the less costly way of doing business for the
manufacturer.
However, sale by independent dealers has its shortcomings too.
For example, finding a qualified dealer and negotiating a contract
acceptable to both parties is a time-consuming process. And due to
the problem of imperfect information, the manufacturer may not be
able to find out beforehand the dealer's hidden flaws, such as a
tendency to renege on contractual obligations. Consequently, the
manufacturer will need to constantly monitor the performance of the
16. See Director & Levi, supra note 3, at 290; BORK, supra note 3, at 288-98.
17. See MICHAEL PARKIN, ECONOMICS 281 (1990).
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distribution agreement after sale responsibilities are assigned to the
downstream firms. This problem complicates Coase's theory,18 in the
sense that the tradeoff between the costs of direct sale and sale by a
dealer becomes harder to assess. In cases where the required
information for evaluating the tradeoff is unavailable, the outcome of
agent sales could be sub-optimal for the manufacturer. The conflict
between the need to use a distribution system and the uncertainty
arising from informational asymmetry can be described as a principal-
agent dilemma.' 9 The costs inflicted upon the manufacturer can be
summarized under two general categories: the costs arising from the
process of adverse selection and those associated with the problem of
moral hazard. 20
A. The Principal-Agent Dilemma and Adverse Selection
Information asymmetry inherent in the principal-agent dilemma
gives rise to the problem of adverse selection. In its most general
definition, "adverse selection" describes an unfavorable outcome to a
firm emerging from voluntary market transactions where "only
consumers with the least desirable characteristics, that are
unobservable to the firm, buy the firm's product."'21 To demonstrate
18. See Coase, supra note 15, at 390-92. (We refer here to the general theorem that in
the absence of transactions costs, parties will bargain themselves to the economically
efficient allocation of resources.)
19. See ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMIcS 608 (3d
ed. 1995). The term "principal-agent" here refers loosely to an employment relationship
in which the welfare of one party (manufacturer-principal) is dependent on how the other
party (distributor-agent) will act. Id. Under this definition, the principal-agent dilemma
could simply be understood as the manufacturer's failure to prevent its distributors from
doing something against its interest. Milgrom and Roberts, on the other hand, offer a
definition of the principal-agent relationship that is more consistent with that in law. See
PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT
170 (1992)(defining principal-agent relationships as "situations in which one individual
(the agent) acts on behalf of another (the principal) and is supposed to advance the
principal's goals").
20. A more detailed classification of principal-agent costs (or more commonly,
"agency costs") has been provided by Michael Jensen and William Meckling. Using
corporate managerial decisions as an example, they divide the costs into three groups.
First, monitoring costs. This group includes the costs incurred by the principal
(stockholders) in order to control the behavior of its agent (manager) through the devices
such as budget or compensation restrictions. Second, bonding costs. It refers to the
expenses that have to be incurred by the agent to signal its intention to act in the best
interest of the corporation. Finally, residual loss. It is defined as the dollar value of the
disparity between the agent's decision and the principal's maximized profits. See Michael
C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305,308 (1976). See also Eugene Fama, Agency
Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288,289 (1980).
21. DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 919 (2d ed. 1994).
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the problem more clearly, consider a transaction in which the buyer is
the better-informed party. The insurance industry provides a good
example.22 In most cases, consumers know more about their own
health conditions and management, when they purchase insurance,
than do the insurance companies. Suppose that an insurance
company offers an insurance program that includes the expenses of
pregnancy and delivery. It is reasonable to predict that people who
are planning to have children will be more likely to purchase the
insurance than people who are not. But the decision to have a child is
hidden information that is frequently unavailable to the insurance
company beforehand. As a result, in setting the premiums, the
insurance company cannot price-discriminateP against its customers
based on their respective needs for the insurance and can only charge
an average premium to all its customers. The premium thereby
determined tends to be lower than the benefit in dollars that could be
derived from the program by customers who are planning to have
children but it will be higher than the benefit to those who are not.
Eventually, a large fraction of the insurance program will be
comprised of customers belonging to the former group. This
generates a less favorable outcome for the insurance company in the
sense that it leads to lower profits for the company than would have
been the case had the population of the insured been randomly
selected.
Consider next the case where the buyer is the less-informed party
in a transaction. That adverse selection can occur in this situation was
demonstrated by George Akerlof with the example of the used-car
market.24 Assume that the used-car market consists of two types of
cars, good and bad used cars ("lemons"). 25 Good used cars are
valued by consumers at the price of $200, and lemons at $100.
Suppose that sellers know the quality of the cars they are selling but
such knowledge would be available to buyers only after purchasing
and driving the cars for a while. Assume further that buyers know
their chances of getting a good used car and a lemon is half-half.
With these assumptions, how much will a buyer pay for a used car?
Since the information regarding the quality of cars is unknown to
the buyers when buying them, they would assume the cars to be of
22. See, e.g., MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 19, at 149; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD,
supra note 19, at 596-97.
23. "Price discrimination" refers to the practice of charging different prices to
different buyers, for the same item. For the various economic definitions, see JACK
HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 244-49 (4th ed. 1988).
24. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488,489-92 (1970).
25. This simplified example of Akerlof's paper is based on CARLTON & PERLOFF,
supra note 21, at 560.
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average quality. To a risk-neutral buyer, he or she will be willing to
pay up to $150 for a used car, as if the car were randomly selected.26
Intuitively, consumers would prefer paying $150 and hoping that they
will get a good used car to paying $200 and taking the risk of buying a
lemon. That is, constrained by the lack of information regarding the
quality of used cars, consumers tend to overvalue lemons but
undervalue good used cars, which will in turn discourage the sellers
from selling good used cars. Over time, the used-car market will
become dominated by lemons. And after realizing that, consumers
will further reduce the prices they are willing to pay for a used car to
a point that only lemons will be sold on the market.27
In the context of distribution arrangements, the problem of
adverse selection occurs when the potential value of the
manufacturer's product to a market is unknown to or difficult-to-
acquire for the manufacturer. As a result, the constituents of the
distribution chain are not optimally selected. Consider the case
where a manufacturer of a famous brand decides to franchise its
product into new markets. Suppose that precontractually, the
prospective franchisees are better informed on the potential value of
the franchise at each market than is the manufacturer. Incomplete
knowledge on the manufacturer's side may cause the prices for the
franchise right to be hard to determine. In a similar vein as the
insurance-market example, the manufacturer may choose to sell its
franchise at an average price on the assumption that demand at each
market will be medium. Likewise, with the price so set, dealers facing
low demand for the product will be more likely to turn down the
offers to become a franchisee and the chain will consist
predominantly of high-demand franchisees. This may not be the
optimal outcome for the manufacturer, in the sense that the overall
sales could be lower than when the chain includes both low-demand
and high-demand franchisees.28
26. The highest price that a buyer will pay for a randomly selected car will be his or
her expected value from the transaction. In the present case, it will be equal to $200 x 0.5
+ $100 x 0.5.
27. For a graphical illustration of this outcome here, see PINDYCK & RUBINFELD,
supra note 19, at 595.
28. This argument is similar to the reasons offered by some economists for believing
that price discrimination enhances consumer welfare. If a firm could charge each
customer according to his reservation price, i.e., the highest price he is willing to pay for an
additional unit of good, the overall sales would be larger than that when the firm charges a
uniform price for all customers. The increase in sales means more customers will be
served and therefore implies a positive welfare effect. See, e.g., JOAN ROBINSON, THE
ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION 206 (2d ed. 1969); PYNDICK & RUBINFELD,
supra note 19, at 364-66; ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 398 (1993).
Analogously, if the manufacturer can distinguish high-demand from low-demand
franchisees and charge them accordingly for the licensing of the franchise, more of its
March 1999]
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Following the above analysis, it is easy to see how the "lemons
problem" could occur in manufacturer-dealer relationships. Consider
the case where several franchisors of the same industry take bids for
franchisees in a certain market. Assume that a "good" franchise is
defined as a chain selling a high-quality product and, therefore, will
be licensed at a higher price than a "bad" franchise. Assume further
that the quality of the franchised product is known to the franchisee
only after he becomes part of the chain and after the product is sold
on the market for a while. Again, due to informational asymmetry,
the price that a prospective franchisee is willing to pay for a franchise
would be too low for the "good" franchise and too high for the "bad"
ones. Eventually, "good" franchises will be driven out of the market
and only "bad" ones will be available in the market.
B. The Principal-Agent Dilemma and Moral Hazard
Unlike adverse selection that occurs before a vertical
relationship is formed, the problem of moral hazard refers to a form
of postcontractual opportunism that arises from the disparity between
the manufacturer and distributors in the objectives pursued. And due
to the difficulty in observing the disparity, one of the parties has an
incentive to pursue its own interest at the expense of the other.29 The
term "moral hazard" (like adverse selection) comes from the
insurance industry.30 In the insurance context, it refers to the
tendency of the insured not to take sufficient precaution to minimize
losses or to avoid accidents from happening after purchasing
insurance. Since it is difficult for the insurance company to know in
advance the propensity of the insured to engage in risky behavior, it
will not be able to correctly specify in the contract what types of
precaution should be taken by the insured. As a result, the insured
may have an incentive to be lax about precaution and consequently to
file larger claims against the insurance company. For example, when
an individual is fully insured against all costs for visits to the doctor,
the lack of responsibility to share medical expenses may diminish his
incentive to stay healthy and induce him to use all kinds of medical
services as frequently as he can.31
In a vertical relationship, moral hazard arises in the form of
reneging on contractual obligations by the parties in the agreement.
Similar to an insurance contract, when the information regarding the
products could be available to consumers at more locations.
29. See MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 19, at 167; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra
note 19, at 604-05.
30. On the definition of "moral hazard," see KARL H. BORSCH, ECONOMICS OF
INSURANCE 317-18 (Knut K. Aase & Agnar Sandmo eds., 1990).
31. See MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 19, at 167-68.
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characteristics of both parties is incomplete, the agreement made
tends to be subject to manipulation and exploitation after taking
effect. For example, a dealer may determine, based on its own cost
consideration, to shirk on its duty under the distribution agreement to
maintain product quality. This could be the result of decreasing
market demand for the manufacturer's product, which makes shirking
more profitable than abiding strictly by the contract.32 And because
the potential for moral hazard cannot be fully verified in advance,
additional costs have to be incurred by the manufacturer to ensure
that the contract will be faithfully enforced. Despite the express
terms in the agreement, the manufacturer may still have to make
efforts to monitor or detect shirking on product quality or other
obligations. When those costs are substantial, moral hazard could
render the distribution arrangement inefficient.
C. Vertical Integration and the Solution to the Principal-Agent Dilemma
Since the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard arise
from informational asymmetry, the solutions to these problems
naturally involve the use of various institutional designs to induce the
provision of the required information.33 From this perspective,
vertical integration could be the most direct and obvious method to
serve this function. By bringing business operations under a unified
governance structure, a firm can avoid the difficulty of obtaining
information regarding the profitability of a particular market and,
therefore, gain additional confidence in the estimates of the value of a
franchise. The problem of adverse selection disappears. Also, the
divergence of interests and the need to monitor and prevent moral
hazard from occurring can be significantly eliminated by merging two
firms with potentially divergent goals into one and consolidating the
decision-making process.34 In sum, vertical integration resolves the
principal-agent dilemma by enabling firms to bypass the obstacle of
32. Equally applicable are those considerations to cases where a supplier is obliged to
provide its dealers inputs with a minimum quality standard but the pursuance of self-
interest induces it to do otherwise.
33. For a detailed discussion of the likely solutions to these problems, see MILGROM
& ROBERTS, supra note 19, at 154-59 (adverse selection), 185-90 (moral hazard).
34. The problem of moral hazard, however, cannot be completely cured by vertical
integration. Moral hazard could arise within a vertically integrated firm, leading to a
misallocation of benefits within the organization. For example, internal transactions could
encourage rent-seeking activities within an integrated firm. That is, a division manager
could lobby the central manager to re-distribute more profits to his own division than
would have been the case had the distribution been based on the profit-maximizing
considerations. Or he could ask for "forgiveness" for any mistakes his division had made.
See DAVID BESANKO ET AL, THE ECONOMICS OF STRATEGY 87-88 (1996). Inefficiencies
of these types are collectively called by Milgrom and Roberts the "influence costs." For a
detailed discussion, see MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 19, at 192-94.
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informational asymmetry.
H. Vertical Control in Competitive Markets: Vertical
Integration and Transaction-Cost Considerations
In the hypothetical world in which the model of perfect
competition operates, firms incur no additional costs, other than their
own production costs, in using independent dealers in their
distribution channels. Within this environment, the now widely
celebrated Coase Theorem predicts that both the upstream and
downstream firms will negotiate and strike a deal that maximizes joint
profits.35 Nevertheless, transaction costs are frequently important
factors that cannot be neglected by firms in designing the ideal
distribution pattern. For example, searching for a qualified
distributor that will fit the need of the manufacturer is usually time-
consuming. Drafting a contract that sets out as broadly as possible all
future contingencies is notoriously laborious, not to mention the
resources invested in haggling during the negotiation process and the
interpretation of contractual terms when disputes arise.
Based on Coase's insight, Williamson developed a framework to
examine how transaction-cost considerations affect institutional
design.36 In particular, Williamson focuses on the costs associated
with ex ante idiosyncratic or transaction-specific investments and ex
post opportunistic actions and how these costs affect the choice
between internal production and outsourcing. We discuss three types
of transaction costs frequently mentioned by commentators, 37 and
examine how they fit into the Williamsonian framework in this part.
We will also examine how vertical integration could be employed to
reduce those costs.
A. The Costs of Searching for Qualified Contracting Partners
As Blair and Kaserman have stated: "[a] sizable portion of the
budgets of the purchasing and marketing departments of many
corporations may be due to the presence of search costs involved in
buying inputs and selling outputs. ''38 The reasons why search costs
are encountered in markets where candidates for distribution
agreements are competitively supplied are related to the
phenomenon of informational asymmetry, particularly the problem of
35. See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
36. See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES (1975).
37. See, e.g., BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 9, at 292-93 (1985); E. THOMAS
SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC
IMPLICATIONS 267 (2d ed. 1994).
38. BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 9, at 292.
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moral hazard. The costs incurred postcontractually by firms to
monitor shirking on product quality by the other party could appear
in the form of more cautious selection of partners precontractually.
In other words, the concern for moral hazard may drive the
manufacturer to conduct deeper investigations on the hidden
characteristics of prospective dealers and thus prolong the period for
the completion of contracts.
On the other hand, search costs could also arise from the
idiosyncratic nature of the product. A typical model of a perfectly
competitive market assumes the product sold to be homogeneous
across the market.39 Under this hypothesis, buyers are indifferent to
the sources from which they purchase the product. But even if the
physical attributes of the goods produced by firms are identical, they
may not be homogeneous in all respects. For example, locational
considerations could place the good produced by the neighboring
supplier on top of the others. Uncertainty among buyers concerning
the reputations of the sellers might lead them to favor the product
sold by a particular seller as well 0 When these possibilities are
considered, the number of qualified candidates for a distribution
agreement declines and search costs increase.
B. The Costs of Reduced Flexibility
Even if one assumes that search costs are trivial in competitive
markets, the formation of a distribution agreement imposes the costs
of reduced flexibility on both parties in the sense that the
manufacturer and dealer are "[locked] into a predetermined pattern
of behavior in order to assure the other party that it has not
misrepresented its intended postsale [sic] performance." 41 In general,
two reasons may contribute to the emergence of such costs.
First, inflexibility results primarily from the limit of human minds
in foreseeing future contingencies and the failure to take these
contingencies into consideration when measuring the value of an
agreement. In the words of Williamson, this is a misfortune caused by
"bounded rationality."42  The adverse consequences of bounded
39. See PARKIN, supra note 17, at 281.
40. Through repeated purchases, for example, a buyer may develop a personal
relationship and trust with a certain seller, and could treat the product sold by the seller to
be different from its competitors.
41. BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 9, at 293.
42. See Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Antitrust: Transaction Cost
Considerations, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1444 (1974)(referring to "bounded rationality"
as a phenomenon in which "[the capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving
complex problems is very small compared with the size of the problems whose solution is
required for objectively rational behavior in the real world"(quoting H. SIMON, MODELS
OF MAN 198 (1957))).
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rationality, in the manufacturer-distributor context, are realized when
incidents occurring after the relationship forms render the
performance of the original contract unprofitable, but the parties
cannot reposition themselves accordingly. For example, when
unanticipated changes in market conditions make direct sale the more
appropriate marketing strategy, adhering to the original distribution
agreement becomes costly for the manufacturer, and yet the
manufacturer may practically be unable to renegotiate the agreement.
Second, inflexibility also occurs when investments during the
existence of a contract are specifically made by a party to cater to the
need of the other.43 Due to their idiosyncrasies and low salvage
value, the party that made the investments will in some situations be
compelled to remain in the contractual relationship even if the other
party has breached the contract. This phenomenon is described in
economic parlance as the creation of "appropriable quasi rents" by
specific investments (which will be discussed in more detail later).44
At this point, a simple illustration is sufficient to understand how it
generates costs, due to inflexibility. Consider again the case of
franchising.45 Suppose that McDonald's purchases and then leases
the buildings for the operation of a business to its franchisees. In
order to create its own brand image, the buildings are distinctively
constructed and designed. Assume that McDonald's later finds out
some of its franchisees fail to live up to the quality standard specified
in the franchise contract. It is clear that McDonald's will feel more
restrained in terminating the relationship with those franchisees than
would have been the case had the buildings not been so specifically
designed and could have been put to use as computer stores or office
buildings.
C. The Costs of Opportunism
The costs of opportunism inherent in vertical relationships are
related to the costs of reduced flexibility. Once the specific
investments are made and the parties whom the investments serve
realize that such investments are unique and will be difficult to be
fully reimbursed by their "next best" alternative uses, they could
easily "hold up" the parties who made the investments by forcing
43. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 95-
96 (1985)(classifying specific investments into four categories: site specificity, physical
asset specificity, human asset specificity, and dedicated assets); BESANKO ET AL., supra
note 34, at 113-14 (utilizing the same categories).
44. See Benjamin B. Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the
Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297-307 (1978) and the numerical
illustration in Part II.C.
45. The example is based on James A. Brickley & Frederick H. Dark, The Choice of
Organizational Form: The Case of Franchising, 18 J. FIN. ECON. 401, 406-07 (1987).
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renegotiation of a new agreement to pursue their interests.46 To see
this point, let's revisit the concept of appropriable quasi-rents, and the
McDonald's example.47
Suppose that the cost for McDonald's to purchase and design the
building is $10,000. To simplify our discussion, assume that it is the
only cost that the franchisor has to incur to license an additional
franchisee. Assume also that the next best use of this $10,000 for the
franchisor is to deposit it in a bank with an annual interest rate of
12%. To the franchisor, the minimum price or franchise fee that will
induce it to enter into a franchise relationship will therefore be $1,200
per year. Under this scenario, economic rents refers to the difference
between this minimum amount and the actual franchise fee received
by the franchisor. A franchisor can demand a positive economic rent
if it has bargaining power over the franchisee. However, when the
number of franchisors bidding for franchisees is large, we would
expect that competition would drive McDonald's rent down to zero.
In this light, the concept of rent is equivalent to that of "economic
profits" in economics.48
Consider next the meaning of "quasi-rents." Suppose that due to
the specificity of the building, it now has few alternative uses.
Suppose that the next best use of the building once it is constructed
would generate annual earnings of $1,000 for McDonald's. It is
obvious that McDonald's will be better off continuing to franchise its
business. And the minimum amount of revenues for McDonald's to
remain in this relationship will also be $1,000. The meaning of
"quasi-rents" could be defined as the difference between the actual
revenues (i.e., the franchise fee) that would be received under the
original franchise contract and this minimum amount that would
prevent the franchisor from terminating and exiting the contractual
arrangement. In our example, the quasi-rents are $200.
The existence of positive quasi-rents creates the incentive for the
franchisees to act opportunistically. Knowing that McDonald's will
accept an offer between $1,200 to $1,000, the franchisees may push
McDonald's to either reduce the franchisee fee after the initial
contract is formed or take the consequence of termination of the
franchise contract. To McDonald's, this is similar to a "hold-up" by
the franchisees in the sense that it would be deprived of the
protection from the original contract. 49
46. Cf. WILLIAMSON, supra note 43, at 47 (defining opportunism as "self-interest
seeking with guile"); Benjamin Klein, Why Hold-Ups Occur: The Self-enforcing Range of
Contractual Relationships, 34 ECON. INQUIRY 444,446 (1996).
47. The following discussion is based on BESANKO ET AL., supra note 34, at 114-16.
48. See id. at 115 n.19.
49. Conversely, franchisees could also be held up due to their investments in human
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D. Vertical Integration as a Means to Minimize Transaction Costs
Williamson provides an analytical framework that explains how
vertical integration could minimize transaction costs. According to
Williamson, transaction costs consist of two main factors:
environmental factors and human factors.50 Market uncertainty and
the costs of finding qualified contracting partners are grouped into
the former category. Bounded rationality coupled with the costs of
opportunism, on the other hand, is classified under the latter.
Williamson shows how the interaction among these four factors
creates transaction costs that handicap the functioning of the market.
Consider first market uncertainty, a problem to a large extent the
product of informational asymmetry. To overcome the inefficiency
created by this, a manufacturer could enter into a long-term contract
with its distributors and thereby reduce the costs of having to find
qualified contracting partners frequently. On the one hand, long-
term contracts could help the firms internalize their specific
investments in physical or human capital, and could thus reduce the
amounts of appropriable quasi-rents.51 But on the other hand, due to
the constraint of bounded rationality in stipulating future
contingencies, transactors could take advantage of the incompleteness
or vagueness of long-term contracts to act opportunistically and to
hold up the parties who are locked in the relationship because of their
specific investments.5 2 And needless to say, long-term contracts will
increase the costs of reduced flexibility.
The second option to reduce market uncertainty would be to sign
a short-term contract subject to periodic renewals by both parties.
Such arrangements allow transactors to take new information into
account during the renewal periods and, therefore, to redraw the
provisions in a way that could better satisfy mutual needs. The costs
of reduced flexibility and opportunism can thereby be reduced.
However, the main drawback of using a short-term contract is that it
creates what Williamson calls the problem of "small numbers." 53
Aside from the problem of finding a qualified transacting partner
precontractually, the term "small numbers" is used by Williamson to
refer specifically to the limited supply of qualified partners during the
renewal periods. For example, as cooperation proceeds, economies
of scope gained through specialized production or cost savings in
capital that are specific to meet the franchisor's need. See Amy Barrett, Indigestion at
Taco Bell, Bus. WK., Dec. 14,1992, at 66-67.
50. See generally WILLIAMSON, supra note 36, at 20-40.
51. See Brickley & Dark, supra note 45, at 409.
52. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 36, at 17; Benjamin Klein, Vertical Integration as
Organizational Ownership, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 199,201 (1988).
53. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 36, at 26-28.
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connection with "first-mover" advantages may induce both parties to
favor the original associate when renewing the contract.5 4 Even if
bidders are competitively supplied ex ante, the advantage thereby
gained could differentiate the products or services provided by the
initial winner from those of competitors ex post, and increase their
costs of finding alternative transacting partners.
Vertical integration can reduce these costs.5 5 The cost of finding
qualified contracting partners need not be ,incurred with integrated
production and thus no problem of "small numbers" is encountered.
Internal production also yields the advantage of more extensive
control over input combinations, eliminating the need for firms to
attempt to construct a fundamental contract governing all likely
contingencies, and increasing the flexibility to adapt to changes in
market conditions. And since the relationship between the affected
parties is turned from rivalry to cooperation, vertical integration
could diminish the incentive to take advantage of specific investments
to hold up contracting partners and, as a result, reduce the costs of
monitoring opportunism.
5 6
54. See id. at 28. The concept of "first-mover advantage" refers to a phenomenon that
the initial contracting partner gains a competitive advantage over late comers through the
learning-by-doing process. See id. at 34-35. For example, being the first to sell a
manufacturer's product in an area, a distributor could, based on the information not
available to outsiders, develop a marketing technique that is best for the sale of the
manufacturer's products and could thereby propose a better offer than its competitors at
the next bidding.
55. See id. at 29-30, 35-37. See also Timothy J. Muris et al., Strategy and Transaction
Costs: The Organization of Distribution in the Carbonated Soft Drink Industry, 1 J. EcoN.
MGMT. & STRATEGY 83 (1992)(showing, through empirical study, that the consideration
to economize on transaction costs in response to the new competitive environment, not
the desire to raise final prices, has influenced Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola to alter their
distribution pattern from that of using independent bottlers to using its own subsidiaries).
56. See, e.g., Irwin M. Stelzer & Richard Schmalensee, Potential Costs and Benefits of
Vertical Integration, 52 ANTrTRusT LJ. 249, 252 (1983)(using R & D as an example to
demonstrate that vertical integration avoids the need to stipulate all contingencies and
could protect the parties from being held up by their specific investments such as those of
knowledge and other human capital devoted to the R & D).
However, it is worth noting here that some commentators have questioned the idea
that vertical integration functions more efficiently than market transactions in reducing
the costs of opportunism. For example, Coase argues that because firms will take into
account the adverse impact on their future business opportunities by acting
opportunistically, the marketplace should be sufficient to internalize those costs. See R.H.
Coase, The Nature of the Firnn Meaning, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 19, 30-31 (1988). See also
John Stucky & David White, When and When Not to Vertically Integrate, 1993 SLOAN
MGMT. REv. 71, 73-74 (1993)(suggesting that in addition to the consideration of costs
inherent in the specific investments, frequency of transaction is also a decisive factor in
inducing firms to adopt vertical integration). But cf. Klein, supra note 52, at 203
(criticizing Coase's arguments).
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I. Vertical Control in Non-Competitive Markets: Vertical
Integration and the Successive Monopoly Problem
In addition to the principal-agent dilemma and the transaction-
cost considerations, firms face different types of concerns about using
independent dealers as sales agents in non-competitive downstream
markets. Perhaps the most frequently discussed issue in this regard is
the "successive monopoly" problem.5 7 Put briefly, the successive
monopoly problem refers to a situation in which the final prices
charged by a monopolist-distributor will be higher and, therefore, the
final sales of the manufacturer's product lower than the levels under
direct sales. The problem arises in principle from the profit-
maximizing processes undertaken by the two monopolists. In this
part, we explain this theory more formally and show how vertical
integration can solve the problem and improve overall welfare.
A. Competitive Price and Output Level
To demonstrate how the successive monopoly problem arises, we
begin first with an examination of the benchmark case; that is, when
both the upstream and downstream markets are competitive. For
expositional purposes, we assume the following:
1. There are two stages of production. The intermediate good I,
produced at stage one by the upstream industry is used to produce the
final good F, at stage two by the downstream industry;
2. The technology of production at stage two is "fixed-
proportions," in the sense that production on one unit of F requires
exactly one unit of I;
3. Firms at both stages face constant marginal costs denoted by
MCi and MCf respectively;
4. The downstream firms incur a constant cost of MCt to
transform I into F;
5. Assume there is no transaction cost.
Figure 1 shows how the price of F is determined when both
stages are in perfect competition.
57. The successive monopoly problem is discussed in most industrial organization
textbooks. The original proof that vertical integration solves the problem was presented
by Spengler, and the economic analysis we present in the text follows Spengler's. See
Joseph J. Spengler, Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy, 58 J. POL. ECON. 347, 350-51
(1950). For a review of the development of this theory, see generally Fritz Machlup &
Martha Taber, Bilateral Monopoly, Successive Monopoly, and Vertical Integration, 27
ECONOMICA 101 (1960). See also CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 21, at 523-25;
TIROLE, supra note 14, at 174-75; WiLLiAM F. SHUGHART II, THE ORGANIZATION OF
INDUSTRY 317-24 (1990). The analysis described here is based on Shughart's framework.







Suppose that Df is the industry demand curve for F and Di
represents the derived demand for 1.58 Under the perfect-competition
assumption, the upstream industry is expected to sell I at its marginal
cost MCi and produce at the level of qi. Within the unintegrated
transactions setting, Pi then becomes part of the production cost for
the downstream industry, and the price for F is denoted in Figure 1 as
Pf where it is equal to Pi + MCt. The final demand for F thus
becomes qf. Under the technology of fixed-proportions production,
qf is equal to qi.
The implication of this illustration is that it makes no difference
whether a manufacturer uses independent distributors to sell its
product or vertically integrates the downstream firms and sells the
product itself when both market levels are competitive. Since both
the upstream and downstream firms are selling at their marginal costs
respectively, they make zero economic profits from the distribution
arrangement. And given the competitive environment at the
downstream market, a manufacturer is incapable of raising the price
of F by vertically integrating one or some of the downstream firms.
By selling I at MCi to its downstream division, the highest price the
integrated firm could charge the consumers will still be Pf.
Accordingly, consumer welfare, in the form of consumer surplus,
remains at the level of the triangular area BAPf before and after
58. The term derived demand refers to a demand for a product "not for its own sake
but in order to use it in the production of [other] goods or services." PARKIN, supra note
17, at 384. In the present case, the demand for I is not for the use of I itself but for the
production of F, and therefore is derived from the demand of F. One of the determinants
of the derived demand is that an increase in the price of F results in an increase in the
price of L See SHUGHART, supra note 57, at 318 n.14.
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vertical integration.59
B. Price and Output Levels Under a Monopolized Upstream Market
Next, let us relax the assumption of a competitive upstream
market and continue to hold the others. Suppose that one firm
monopolizes the supply of I. MRi is introduced in Figure 2 to
represent the marginal revenue curve facing the upstream
monopolist. Following the profit-maximizing process, the input
supplier is expected to produce I up to the point where its marginal
cost is equal to its marginal revenue.6° That is, the upstream
monopolist will produce qi units of I at the price of Pi for each unit
sold. In turn, Pi becomes part of the downstream firm's marginal cost
of producing F which is equal to Pi plus MCt. With a competitive
downstream market, it is also the price that F will be sold to the
consumers. In sum, the final price and output levels under this
circumstance can be represented by Pf and qf in Figure 2.
P
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f .... .. ................................................................................... P i+ M C t
............................... MCf




With a monopolized upstream market and a competitive
downstream market, we again observe the same welfare implications
with or without the employment of vertical integration by the
59. In economics, the concept of consumer surplus is defined as the difference
between the highest price a consumer is willing to pay for a product (reservation price),
which is represented by the higher point on the demand curve, and the price he or she
actually pays for it times the quantities purchased. Adding up the surplus over the buyers
in a market yields the total consumer welfare or aggregated benefits from the transaction.
See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 19, at 113-14. Therefore, consumer surplus in the
present case is the triangular area surrounded by Df, MCf, and the vertical axis in Figure
1.
60. See id. at 322-24.
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upstream firm. In the case of "separate sale," the downstream firms
will continue to make zero economic profits. The upstream firm will
capture a monopoly profit represented by the rectangular area of
PiCDE from selling L 61 Consumer welfare in the form of consumer
surplus will be B'A'Pf.
Now, consider the case of integrated operation. Suppose the
upstream monopolist acquires one of the downstream distributors.
Instead of charging the profit-maximizing price Pi, the upstream
monopolist sells Ito its downstream division at its marginal cost, MCi.
Will the internal transfer of input increase the integrated firm's
profits at the downstream market? The answer is no. Given the price
of MCi, the downstream division's production cost of F becomes MCf
which is equal to MCi+MCt. It is obvious from Figure 2 that MCf is
lower than the competitive price Pf, and, therefore, the downstream
division could earn a profit of (Pf-MCf)xqf.62 However, under the
construction of Figure 2, this profit will be totally offset by the loss
that the upstream monopolist has to incur by selling I at its marginal
cost instead of at the monopoly price. By the same token, even if the
manufacturer could in some way acquire a substantial portion or all of
the downstream firms, the increase in the downstream profits is
simply an internal transfer of the monopoly rents from the upstream
firm.63 Taking the integrated firm as a whole, the benefits that could
be captured are unaffected by integration. Also, consumer welfare
will remain at the level of B'A'Pf. The overall welfare effect after
vertical integration is the same as that in the "separate sale" case. To
be sure, in comparison with Figure 1, the amount of consumer surplus
is decreased; but this is due to the exercise of the pricing power by the
upstream monopolist, which in essence is a horizontal problem and
usually cannot be cured by prohibiting vertical integration.
C. The Successive Monopoly Problem
Let us further relax the assumption of a competitive downstream
market and examine the scenario when both the upstream and
downstream markets are dominated by two separate monopolists.
Respectively, let MRi and MRf in Figure 3 represent the curves of
61. A monopolist's profits from sales is the aggregation of the difference between the
marginal cost of the product and the price actually paid by the consumer. In the present
case, they are equal to (Pi-MCi)x qi.
62. Insofar as the downstream market remains competitive, Pf will still be the optimal
price for the integrated firm to sell F. It cannot take advantage of the cost savings from
internal transfer of I to raise the final price above the level of Pf because it will lose all its
sales. On the other hand, pricing F below Pf is irrational because given the large number
of sellers in the market, the integrated firm cannot thereby increase the demand of F from
itself.
63. See SHUGHART, supra note 57, at 319-20.
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marginal revenue schedules facing the upstream and downstream
firms. To simplify our analysis, assume that the upstream monopolist
sells I to industries other than that of the downstream monopolist
(thereby avoiding the need to consider the case of monopsony
here).64 (Figure 3 looks shockingly complex at first glance, but we
must ask the reader to take a few seconds to stare at it. It is much
simpler than it looks, and we will need to refer to it here and at one











Consider first the case of unintegrated operation in which both
firms independently make price and output decisions based on their
own profit-maximizing objectives. The upstream monopolist starts by
producing I at the level where MRi is equal to MCi, and would charge
the downstream firm Pi for each unit of L With that price, the
downstream monopolist's marginal cost of production will be raised
to MCf and the final output of F will be reduced to the level qf, where
MCf is equal to its marginal revenue MRf at the price of Pf per unit.
In effect, it is as if the actual demand for I is the curve MRi in Figure
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365 and the upstream monopolist will begin producing by equating
MCi with the new corresponding marginal revenue curve mr. In sum,
given that both the upstream and downstream markets are
monopolized, profit-maximizing considerations by the two
monopolists will lead to an increase in the final price and a reduction
in the sale of the final products. Coincidentally, the derived demand
for the input will also fall.
To gain an intuitive understanding of this phenomenon, consider
the following example by Justice (then Judge) Breyer.66 Suppose that
the market of aluminum ingot is monopolized and it costs $40 to
produce. The transformation cost of fabricating ingot into aluminum
sheet is presumed to be $35. Assume the profit-maximizing price for
the sheet is $100. With a competitive market for aluminum sheet, the
ingot monopolist will charge $65 for the ingot to ensure that the final
price will maintain at the profit-maximizing level. On the other hand,
if the fabricating market is dominated by an independent dealer and
the input is priced at $65, the dealer will mark up the final price by
more than $35 because the dealer will want to maximize its profits as
well. By so doing, however, the dealer increases the final price for the
sheet and reduces the quantities demanded for both the sheet and the
ingot.
The phenomenon described here is commonly referred to by
economists as the successive monopoly problem. It is a "problem" for
the upstream firm because the downstream firm's self-interest
conflicts with its own. And similar to the resolution of the principal-
agent dilemma, one of the solutions to this problem is to bypass the
distributors and sell the product directly via vertical integration.
Unlike what we have seen in Sections A and B, vertical integration
employed in a successively monopolized environment has the effect
of improving overall social welfare.
Consider first the change in profits to the monopolists. Before
integration, the profits that could be made by the upstream and
downstream firms from the sale of I and F respectively are (Pi-
MCi)xqi and (Pf-MCf)xqf. Together, both monopolists earn a profit
of (Pf-MCf')xqf which is equal to the rectangular area of PfAED in
Figure 3.67 After integration, the integrated firm internally transfers I
to its downstream division at its marginal cost and thereby induces
the downstream division to produce F at the cost of MCf'. With the
65. Since the optimal output level of F occurs at the point where MRf=MCf=Pi+MCt,
we can rewrite the equation as Pi=MRf-MCt. This could be viewed as the demand
function for L
66. See Town of Concord, Mass. v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17,24 (1st Cir. 1990).
67. Proof. The total monopoly gains for the upstream and downstream firms are (Pi-
MCi)xqf + (Pf-MCtxqf=[Pi-MCi+Pf-(Pi+MCt)]xqf=(Pf-MCf')xqf.
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same profit-maximizing consideration as that of a monopolist, the
optimal price-quantity combination for the integrated firm now
becomes Pf' and qf'. Compare the changes in total profits that could
be earned by the monopolists. The upstream division of the
integrated firm now makes zero economic profit and will capture all
the monopoly gains through its downstream division. With the same
calculation conducted previously, the total profits for the integrated
firm will be (Pf'-MCf')xqf' and can be represented by Pf'CGD. It is
obvious from Figure 3 that Pf'CGD is larger than PfAED.
Furthermore, since the final price is reduced from Pf to Pf' after
integration, consumer welfare in the form of consumer surplus is
increased from BAPf to BCPf'. In sum, vertical integration makes
both the producers and consumers better off.
D. Vertical Integration Under the Technology of Variable-Proportions
Production
The positive welfare implication associated with using vertical
integration to solve the successive monopoly problem has led
proponents of the Chicago School to promote the view that vertical
integration should be subject to a less stringent legal standard.68 But
such a proposal is not without challenge. In particular, commentators
have questioned the conclusion that vertical integration will be
beneficial to the producers and consumers, noting that the positive
welfare result may not hold when one relaxes the assumption of fixed
proportions production
In the real world, industries often use production technologies in
which input combinations are variable. That is, different portions of
inputs can be adjusted from time to time, based on fluctuations of
their relative prices, to produce the same amount of output. For
example, within a fixed expenditure constraint, a producer could
switch between using either five units of labor and two units of
capital, or four units of labor and three units of capital to
manufacture a computer, depending on relative prices of capital and
labor. In the extreme case where one of the inputs is monopolized
and the other competitively supplied, the technology of variable-
proportions production may lead the downstream firm to use too
much of the competitive input and too little of the monopolized one.
The welfare effect of vertical integration under variable-
proportions production is indeterminate. In general, it depends on
the balance of two factors.69 First, for the integrated firm, vertical
68. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 3, at 196-201 (1976); BORK, supra note 3, at 226-30.
69. See generally HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY. See also
Perry, supra note 13, at 191; BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 9, at 304; F.M. SCHERER &
DAvID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRuCrURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 523-
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integration eliminates inefficient production at the downstream
market. Input combinations can be restored to the level that
minimizes production costs and, thereby, increases productive
efficiency at the downstream market.70 Second, after integration, the
integrated firm could control all the downstream industry's inputs,
not just the one input it makes. It could further lead the integrated
firm to abuse its monopoly power to reduce output, increase the price
for the final product, and decrease allocative efficiency.71 Contrary to
the proposition advanced by the Chicago School, this analysis implies
that antitrust enforcement agencies may need to make a tradeoff
between the efficiency gains associated with the removal of distorted
input combinations and the welfare loss attributable to the
augmentation of monopoly power.72
IV. Vertical Restraints as Substitutes for Vertical Integration
in Competitive Markets
In some cases, vertical restraints offer the same virtues as those
of vertical integration in alleviating the costs of separate distribution
in competitive markets. In general, these costs are specific
realizations of the principal-agent dilemma and the transaction costs
inherent in vertical relationships. That is, in pursuance of their own
interests, distributors create additional costs, or "externalities," that
are borne by the manufacturer. And as Tirole explains, to
"internalize" those externalities, competition among downstream
dealers has to be reduced or eliminated by the manufacturer, through
the imposition of various contractual restraints to give them a
property right against any predation of their investments in
promoting the manufacturer's product.73
24 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 3d ed. 1990). See Part I of the appendix.
70. See generally HOVENKAMP, supra note 69.
71. See SCHERER & Ross, supra note 69, at 523; HOVENKAMP, supra note 69 at 337-
38.
72. Nevertheless, such a "trade off" model for the evaluation of the welfare effect of
vertical integration with variable-proportions technology is criticized by Professor
Shughart as misleading. In particular, the model is based on the assumption that vertical
integration will in some ways change a competitive output market into a monopolistic
market which will lead to an increase of the final price. On this assumption, efforts from
antitrust enforcement agencies to balance various elements concerning efficiency is
warranted. However, Shughart points out that it is not only unlikely but also rare that an
input monopolist could use vertical integration to change a competitive downstream
market. See SHUGART, supra note 57, at 324. Moreover, even if vertical integration does
lead to price increases, the adverse effects are attributable to horizontal market power at
the downstream market, and could be more appropriately attacked by horizontal than by
vertical antitrust doctrines. See id.
73. See TIROLE, supra note 14, at 183.
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A. Exclusive Dealing Arrangements and the Adverse-Selection Problem
Generally, an exclusive dealing arrangement can be broadly
defined to include both exclusive dealing contracts and requirement
contracts. A requirement contract is a commitment from a
downstream firm to purchase a minimum amount or all of its required
inputs from the upstream supplier. Its function in resolving the
successive monopoly problem will be addressed later. On the other
hand, an exclusive dealing contract refers to an agreement between
the upstream and downstream firms in which one promises to deal
only with the other. One of its advantages, equivalent with vertical
integration, is that it facilitates the reduction of costs related to
adverse selection.
When the quality of the manufacturer's product varies over units,
it is foreseeable that this will induce the distributors to spend time
and effort sorting out products with higher quality. In comparison
with the case where all distributors have the same expectation
regarding the average quality of the manufacturer's product, such
inspection is usually costly and of no collective value.74 This
oversearching, and the associated costs, could be greatly reduced if
both parties agreed to have the distributors pay an average price for
the manufacturer's promise to provide the product of average quality,
an arrangement that could be secured through a requirements
contract.75 However, such an arrangement might in turn induce the
manufacturer to sort out the high-quality items and sell them to other
dealers at higher prices. Exclusive dealing contracts constrain the
manufacturer's freedom to transact elsewhere and, as a result,
eliminate the adverse selection costs that are likely to be borne by the
distributors. 76
B. Vertical Restraints and the Problems of Moral Hazard
As far as using vertical restraints to resolve the problem of moral
hazard in vertical relationships, two specific cases are frequently
74. See EDWARD C. GALLICK, FTC STAFF REP., BUREAU COMPETITION,
ExcLusIvE DEALING AND VERTICAL INTEGRATION: THE EFFICIENCY OF CONTRACTS
IN THE TUNA INDUSTRY 12 (1984).
75. In a similar vein, Kenney and Klein have argued that the consideration of reducing
oversearching costs is the main reason why De Beers, the famous diamond supplier, sells
its diamond by packages and on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. See Roy W. Kenney &
Benjamin Klein, The Economics of Block Booking, 26 J.L. & ECON. 497,502-05 (1983).
76. By selling only one manufacturer's product, however, the appropriable quasi-rents
created by exclusive dealing could be significant. Therefore, it might induce the
manufacturer to act opportunistically. Gallick suggests that this is a problem of tradeoff.
If the net effect between the benefit of exclusive dealing and the cost it will impose is
positive, exclusive dealing could still be an efficient arrangement. See GALLICK, supra
note 74, at 12-13, 18.
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discussed by commentators: the free-riding problem and the dilution
of product reputation or brand image. In both cases, vertical
restraints are instituted by the manufacturer with a view toward
protecting investments made by the distributors in providing services
or other promotional efforts and, thereby, maintaining the quality of
the product and keeping its sales at a high level.
(1) Vertical Restraints and the Free-Riding Problem
In general, manufacturers favor more services or promotional
efforts from their distributors because they will increase market
demand for their products. To consumers, services and promotional
efforts are indispensable in some circumstances. For example, a
buyer may need a detailed explanation or presale testing before
deciding to purchase an expensive hi-fi stereo.77 To accommodate
these needs, additional investments may have to be made by the
distributors in hiring presale service personnel or installing show
rooms. Furthermore, intensive advertisements or enthusiastic
recommendations from the distributors may be crucial for successful
marketing when the product is new to local markets or when the
manufacturer is located far (geographically or even culturally) from
the market that it wishes to penetrate. Equipped with their superior
knowledge regarding local demand conditions and customers'
preferences, the required promotional efforts could be more
effectively provided by a local distributor than the manufacturer
itself.
Nevertheless, in ensuring that the distributor will provide the
required services or promotional efforts, a normal contract stipulating
the distributors' responsibilities to perform those functions will be
subject to the "free-riding" problem. Simply put, free-riding will
occur when the good being supplied is a "public good. '78 Because the
benefits generated from the supply of a public good are
nonexcludable, people have an incentive to wait for others to incur
the cost of providing the goods and then take a free ride on the
benefits.79 In the context of vertical distribution, the provision of
77. Presale services are especially needed when the good involved are durable goods
or what Porter calls the "nonconvenience goods." Buyers of nonconvenience goods will
rely more heavily on technical support, the ease of obtaining the required services, and are
more willing to shop around before purchasing. See MICHAEL E. PORTER, INTERBRAND
CHOICE, STRATEGY, AND BILATERAL MARKET POWER 106 (1976).
78. "A commodity is called a 'public good' if its consumption by any one person does
not reduce the amount available for others." HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 23, at 478. For a
more detailed discussion of the theory, see id. at 478-82. In the context of a retail market,
information is often the best example of a public good. If one retailer advertises heavily,
the information he feeds to potential buyers will benefit competing retailers.
79. See PINDYK & RUBINFELD, supra note 19, at 649.
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presale services and promotional efforts create an important type of
public good -- information. A distributor understands that the
provision of information will increase sales of its product. But it also
realizes that once the information is created by one of its rivals, it
could easily take advantage of that information to increase its own
sales. Therefore, it would be preferable to the distributor, thinking
only of itself, not to provide the services. If such thinking is prevalent
among the distributors, no services or promotional efforts will be
provided.
Mathewson and Winter's externality hypothesis provides a
theoretical framework for understanding the free-riding problem.80
Under their model, a simple vertical contract creates three types of
externalities.81 First of all, it creates a vertical externality. By vertical
externality, we refer to the failure of a distributor to collect all of the
increase in profits in connection with its sale efforts because part of
the profits will go to the manufacturer in the form of wholesale
margin. This, in turn, reduces the distributor's incentive to provide
services or promotional efforts.82
Consider a numerical example. Suppose there is one distributor,
and the quantity sold depends on that distributor's effort in
promoting the product. The retail price of the product is $2, the
wholesale price is $1, the cost of the distributor's initial effort is $.10,
and the unit cost of the product is $.20. If Q0 is the quantity sold
when the integrated manufacturer invests $.10 worth of effort into
promotions, then the profit for the integrated unit at the initial level
of effort is ($2 - $.10 - $.20)(Q 0)=($1.70)(Q 0). Under the separate-
sales agreement, the distributor's profit at the initial level of effort is
($2 - $.10 - $1)=($.90)(Q 0). Consider the effects of a change in effort
levels from $.10 per unit to $.20 per unit with sales quantity rising
from Q0 to Q1 . The integrated unit would see the value of the
increase as ($1.60)(Q 1 - Q0) - ($-10)Q, , while the distributor alone
would see the change as ($.80)(Q 1 - Q0) - ($-10)Q 0- It is clear that the
gain from the increase in effort is smaller for the distributor, and
indeed may be negative for him, when it would be positive for the
integrated manufacturer-distributor.
Second, a simple vertical contract creates a horizontal externality
among distributors. Recall the previous stereo example. If discounts
are allowed, a customer could simply go to a store that provides the
pre-sale services, obtain the information regarding the product from
80. See generally G.F. Mathewson & R.A. Winter, The Economics of Vertical
Restraints in Distribution, in NEW DEVELOPMENTs IN THE ANALYSIS OF MARKET
STRUCrURE 211-36 (Joseph E. Stiglitz & G. Frank Mathewson eds., 1986).
81. See id. at 220-221.
82. See id. at 221.
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the distributor, and then walk a few blocks away to purchase the same
product from a discounter. Furthermore, the horizontal externality
could also occur at the upstream market. To avoid the free-riding
problem, a manufacturer might wish to provide the required
promotional efforts for all its distributors. For example, it might
adopt a nation-wide advertising program to promote its product. But
if the distributors are not prohibited from selling other competing
brands, those efforts could be used by distributors as "bait" to lure
customers to visit their stores and then recommend the customers
purchase the brands that do not have such services but are sold at
lower prices. To the distributors, this "bait-and-switch" strategy
could provide higher profits than when only the manufacturer's
product is sold.83
The third externality is the infonnational externality. This refers
to the spillover effect that one distributor provides to adjacent rivals
through its own efforts of providing product information. For
example, a customer could be informed of a new product from an
advertisement provided by one distributor, but purchase the product
at another store. Through the information it provided, the distributor
increases the demand for the new product from its competitors.84
Vertical restraints could serve to internalize these externalities.
To encourage the downstream firms to provide the required services,
the manufacturer could create a minimum amount of profits for the
distributors by imposing a resale price floor.85 The vertical externality
could thereby be attenuated. Moreover, to the extent that the resale
prices of the same brand are capped from below across the market,
the incentive to free ride on other distributors' services by price
discounts is diminished. Thus, the horizontal externality could also be
held in check.86
Another mechanism that could be used to control the
downstream free-riding behavior is a territorial restriction
arrangement. By assigning an exclusive sale territory to a specific
distributor and prohibiting its competitors from selling into that area,
the manufacturer could effectively deter other distributors from
soliciting customers across their borders and "skimming the cream"
created by its neighbors' own sale efforts.87 In addition, there are two
83. See Howard P. Marvel, Exclusive Dealing, 25 J.L. & ECON. 1, 7 (1982); Victor P.
Goldberg, The Free Rider Problem, Imperfect Pricing, and the Economics of Retailing
Services, 79 Nw. U. L. REv. 736,745 (1984).
84. See Mathewson & Winter, supra note 80, at 220.
85. See Telser, supra note 3, at 91.
86. See id.
87. On "cream-skinning" generally, see William A. Brock & David S. Evans,
Creamskimming, in BREAKING UP BELL: ESSAYS ON INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND
REGULATION 61-94 (David S. Evans ed., 1983). The "cream-skimming" entrant is able to
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measures to resolve the bait-and-switch dilemma. An upstream firm,
a franchisor for example, could charge its franchisees royalties based
on their total sales revenue or units sold across all brands to extract
part of the franchisees' profits from selling other brands that is
attributable to the franchisor's promotional efforts.88 The other way
to avoid upstream free riding is to adopt an exclusive dealing
arrangement. An exclusive dealing contract forecloses opportunities
for the distributor to sell other brands and preserves the distributors'
undivided loyalty to promote only the product produced by the
manufacturer. It thus ensures that the profits generated from the
promotional efforts will be captured by the manufacturer.
89
(2) Vertical Restraints and the Maintenance of Product Reputation or Brand
Image.
Arguments justifying the use of vertical restraints to maintain
product reputation or brand image are closely related to the analysis
of the free-riding problem. When shirking on product quality occurs,
the adverse impact it creates often permeates the whole distribution
network and harms the manufacturer's reputation. For example,
McDonald's reputation in the fast-food industry could be tarnished if
one of its franchisees located near the exit of an interstate highway
shirked on the quality of its hamburgers. A customer who bought a
rotten hamburger from the franchisee may never return. However,
the impression of "McDonald's lousy hamburgers" could spill over to
franchisees at other locations and reduce the demand for their
hamburgers. 90 As the Fifth Circuit in Kentucky Fried Chicken Co. v.
offer a lower price than its competitor, but only because it has managed to avoid some cost
that is associated with selling in a given market. Thus, the cream-skimming entrant is not
a cheaper producer-it competes only because it is able to take advantage of certain
infrastructure expenditures borne by its rivals. The classic example involved the long-
distance carriers who were able to compete against AT&T largely because AT&T was
forced by regulators to keep its long-distance charges above the competitive level. See,
e.g., William J. Baumol & Janusz A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition, 28
J.L. & Econ. 247,257 (1985).
88. See Katz, supra note 10, at 655, 717.
89. See Marvel, supra note 83, at 6-7; Goldberg, supra note 83, at 745 (quoting
Marvel's view); Richard M. Steuer, Exclusive Dealing in Distribution, 69 CORNELL L.
REV. 101, 130 (1983). According to Katz, however, the anticipated benefits from using
exclusive dealing contract under this circumstance must be offset by the increase in the
distribution costs. Two types of distribution costs are specifically mentioned by Katz.
First, by requiring distributors to sell only one single brand, it could lead to an increase of
distribution costs associated with the lost economies of scale in downsize selling. Second,
consumers may therefore choose to go to multi-brand stores first in order to minimize
their search costs. The distributors could suffer diminishing sales. See Katz, supra note 10,
at 697.
90. Paul H. Rubin, The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract,
21 J.L. & ECON. 223, 228 (1978). Shirking or cheating on product quality could occur in a
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Diversified Packaging Co.91 noted: "A customer dissatisfied with one
Kentucky Fried outlet is unlikely to limit his or her adverse reaction
to the particular outlet; instead, the adverse reaction will likely be
directed to all Kentucky Fried stores." 92
In addition, the product reputation justification is similar to the
resolution of the bait-and-switch dilemma described above. Just as
with the downstream distributors in bait-and-switch cases, upstream
suppliers or manufacturers have an incentive to free ride on their
competitor's brand name. For example, they could request their
distributors to place their products adjacent to more famous brands.
Customers who are attracted by those brands, but are more price
conscious, might therefore switch to the low-price products that are
closest to the prestigious brand on the shelf.
To avoid free riding on product quality, firms need mechanisms
to reduce or to eliminate the possibility of substitution between high-
quality and low-quality products. Viewed in this light, the desire of
firms to use tying or exclusive dealing arrangements seems obvious.
Tying is a common arrangement in franchising where a franchisor
bundles the licensing of its trademark (the "tying" product) with the
purchase of inputs (the "tied" product) from the franchisor itself or
from a supplier designated by the franchisor.93 The purpose of this
arrangement is to ensure that by using inputs of the same quality, a
franchisee's incentive to free ride on the efforts by other franchisees
could be eliminated. 94 Moreover, under the tying arrangement, when
the shipment of inputs from sources other than the franchisor or its
"reverse" fashion. Goldberg has noted that a manufacturer might cheat on its product
quality as well if the distributor is a famous outlet in the market and carries more than the
manufacturer's brand. Customers may rely on the distributor's reputation to purchase a
brand that is unknown to them but is sold at the distributor's store. The manufacturer
may take advantage of this opportunity to promote their low-quality products and dilute
the distributor's reputation. See Goldberg, supra note 83, at 748.
This problem explains why it is more common to observe franchisors using both
integrated operation and franchising in practice. In markets where customers seldom
make repeated purchases, the franchisor might prefer company-owned outlets to
franchising because of quality concerns. Therefore, the co-existence of integrated
operation and franchising could be viewed as a strategic response to the divergence in
demand conditions. Cf. Brickley & Dark, supra note 45, at 418 (stating that the higher
costs of monitoring employees at outlets near the interstate highways may lead the
franchisor to use franchising system).
91. 549 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1977).
92. Id. at 380.
93. See J. Thomas McCarthy, Trademark Franchising and Antitrust: The Trouble with
Tie-ins, 58 CAL. L. REv. 1085, 1110 (1970).
94. See Benjamin Klein & Lester F. Saft, The Law and Economics of Franchise Tying
Contracts, 28 J.L. & ECON. 345,349-51(1985); Scott Makar, In Defense of Franchisors: The
Law and Economics of Franchise Quality Assurance Mechanisms, 33 VILL. L. REv. 721,
729-31 (1988).
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designated supplier is observed, the franchisor could reasonably
suspect that shirking might be occurring, and thus tying makes the
detection of shirking easier.95 Alternatively, to recoup investments in
creating a brand image, firms with more famous brand names could
enter into exclusive dealing contracts with distributors, prohibiting
them from selling other brands. This denies competitors the
opportunity to capitalize on the investments of the famous brand
holder.
Aside from product reputation, brand image could also be
subject to free-riding behavior. In a general sense, a high price signals
high quality and psychologically creates the image of superiority. As
Richard Caves has described, by charging a higher price, the
manufacturer "provides a signal of high quality... by assuring that
the product is distributed only by [the distributors] whose costly
premises signal a quality image. '96 Some customers may be willing to
pay a high price for a product in exchange for its presumed higher
quality or for its association with a more prestigious social status.
Price cutting by a distributor may increase its own sales; but it could
also dilute the value of brand image and reduce the probability of
repeat purchases.97 On balance, this could reduce the total profits of
the whole chain. By discouraging price competition, minimum resale
price maintenance can prevent the high-quality brand image from
being dissipated.
C. Vertical Restraints and the Mitigation of Transaction Costs
(1) Vertical Restraints and the Reduction of the Costs of Finding Qualified
Contracting Partners
Instead of spending time and effort investigating the hidden
95. See Klein & Saft, supra note 94, at 353. Tying itself may not totally eliminate the
problem of detecting shirking if the franchisees are allowed to use a non-franchise input in
conjunction with a non-franchise product. Other types of restraints such as exclusive
dealing are required to supplement tying to control product reputation. The combined use
of tying and exclusive dealing to ensure product quality may be understood under the
"optimal franchising theory" described in Part VI discussing optimal franchising theory.
And the extent to which the policing costs will be reduced by tying depends on how much
effort will need to be exercised by the franchisor itself after tying. See Makar, supra note
94, at 739.
96. Richard E. Caves, Vertical Restraints in Manufacturer-Distributor Relations:
Incidences and Economic Effects, in ANTITRUST AND REGULATION 29, 40 (Ronald E.
Grieson ed., 1986).
97. This phenomenon is described by economists as the "snob effect," which refers to
the desire to own unique products. A consumer's demand for a snob good will be higher
when fewer people own it. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 19, at 120; Harvey
Leibenstein, Bandwagon, Snob, and Veblen Effects in the Theory of Consumers' Demand,
64 QJ. Econ. 183, 199 (1950)(presenting a theoretical analysis of the snob effect).
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characteristics of distributors and to find qualified contracting
partners, an upstream firm may induce the downstream dealers to
voluntarily abide by their contractual obligations and eliminate their
incentive to shirk through appropriately designed contractual
arrangements that will render default unprofitable for the dealers.
98
The franchise fee and minimum resale price maintenance
arrangements offer illustrations.
Consider the franchise fee first. Unlike charging distributors a
uniform price for each additional unit they purchase, a two-part
tariff99 pricing scheme is the most unique feature that distinguishes
franchising from other distribution methods. This refers to a pricing
arrangement that requires a franchisee to pay an up front lump-sum
fee (the first part of the tariff) to secure the right to purchase the
franchisor's tangible goods at an agreed upon unit price for each
purchase (the second part of the tariff). In situations where
informational asymmetry exists and the resources committed to
monitor the franchisees' performance of their contractual obligations
are significant, a franchisor could require the franchisees to pay a
higher franchise fee to compensate for the reduction in the value of
its product should reneging occur. The same rationale applies to the
situations where a famous franchisee requests a lower franchise fee to
offset the losses arising from the franchisor's chiseling on its duty to
supply a high-quality product. In both, the franchise fee serves a
similar function; as a "bond" used by the franchisor or franchisee to
force the other party to live up to their contractual obligations. Such
a bonding mechanism reduces the need to carefully screen
contracting partners. 1°°
Minimum resale price maintenance could be used to reduce the
costs of finding contracting partners, in a similar fashion. Insofar as
the profits from reneging outweigh the capitalized value of those that
98. In a broader sense, this is the "self-enforcing contract" theory proposed by
Professor Klein. See Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in
Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615, 635-37 (1981); Benjamin Klein
& Kevin M. Murphy, Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms, 31 J.L. &
ECON. 265, 270-76 (1988); Benjamin Klein, The Economics of Franchise Contracts, 2 J.
CORP. FIN. 9,17-22 (1995); Klein, supra note 46, at 449-50.
99. "Two-part tariff," "quantity-dependent pricing," and "nonlinear pricing" have
been used interchangeably by economists to describe this pricing pattern. See TIROLE,
supra note 14, at 143; CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 21, at 462; Hal R. Varian, Price
Discrimination, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 597, 604 (Richard
Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989); LOUIS PHILIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF PRICE
DISCRIMINATION 166 (1983).
100. See Benjamin Klein, Transaction Cost Determinants of "Unfair" Contractual
Arrangements, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 356, 359 (1980); Kabir C. Sen, The Use of Initial Fees
and Royalties in Business-Format Franchising, 14 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 175,
177 (1993).
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could be earned had the contract been duly performed plus the cost
of penalty, the incentive to renege will still remain even when the
obligation to provide the required services and to maintain product
quality has been unequivocally stipulated in the contract. Two
contractual arrangements might be necessary for the contract to be
self-enforcing. First, the manufacturer could enlarge the future
stream of the premium for honoring the contract to the extent that it
will be greater than the benefits from reneging.10 Second, the
manufacturer must be able to credibly terminate the distributorship
should reneging occur. Replacing the punishments from the courts,
the right of termination will impose immediate economic losses on
the distributors and make reneging unprofitable. And according to
Benjamin Klein, the threat of being terminated will provide sufficient
stimulus for the distributors to perform the contract.'02 Minimum
resale price maintenance stifles retail price competition, making it less
attractive to distributors to shirk. 0 3
On the other hand, when the gains from reneging are greater, the
manufacturer may have to lower its wholesale price to increase the
future profits for its distributors. Without fixing a price floor,
however, this profit margin may not be dissipated by a service
provision but could be used by the distributors to lower their retail
prices to attract more customers from one another. Minimum resale
price maintenance under this circumstance is the means for the
manufacturer to protect the future premium it creates for the
distributors. 1°4 And again, once the price floor is properly set, the
need to probe into the characteristics of distributors is greatly
reduced.
(2) Vertical Restraints and the Reduction of the Costs of Reduced Flexibility
Unlike vertical integration which provides a manufacturer the
opportunity to obtain more information regarding market demand,
tying arrangements or requirement contracts mandate a sharing
between the manufacturer and its distributors of the losses resulting
from incidences unforeseeable before the contract is formed, and
could thereby alleviate the costs of "reduced flexibility.' 0 5 Consider
the case where a manufacturer producing two products intends to
license the whole production line to distributors. Assume the
wholesale prices are set before the demand or popularity of the
products is known and cannot be perfectly adjusted according to the
101. See Klein & Leffler, supra note 98, at 617.
102. See Klein, supra note 98, at 18.
103. See Klein & Murphy, supra note 98, at 276.
104. See id.
105. On "reduced flexibility," see infra text accompanying notes 41-45.
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change in market conditions for each product.
Usually, investments have to be made for each product, to start
producing, before demand conditions are known to the manufacturer.
But once the demand for each product becomes observable, the
downstream firms will be inclined to order more of the popular
product and less of the unpopular one. Meeting this demand may not
be in the manufacturer's best interest. Because of the difficulty of
transforming the production technology of the unpopular product
into that of the popular one, the surge in the demand for the popular
product may impose two types of costs on the manufacturer. First,
the demand for the unpopular good might decrease to the extent that
it fails to cover its allocation of fixed costs. Second, when the
capacities of both products are constrained, the increase in the
demand for the popular product may eventually increase its marginal
cost to a point where marginal cost begins to exceed marginal
revenue. The manufacturer may be better off if it continues to
produce the unpopular product to share the setup costs during the
transitory period.1°6 Tying the purchase of the unpopular with the
sale of the popular product, or a requirement contract mandating the
purchase of the specific amount of the unpopular product, could be
helpful for the manufacturer to internalize these costs.
(3) Vertical Restraints and the Reduction of the Costs of Opportunism
Under certain conditions, tying and exclusive dealing offer the
parties a chance to deter hold-up behavior and thereby reduce the
costs of opportunism. Consider the case where a franchisor agrees in
a long-term contract to supply its franchisees' inputs at a constant
price. In the absence of arrangements that could effectively prohibit
the franchisees from defaulting on their purchase obligations, the
franchisees' incentive to hold up the franchisor during the periods of
lower spot prices by threatening to switch to a rival is apparent. In a
similar vein, when an unexpected surge in market demand results in
an inventory shortage, the manufacturer may threaten to renege on
its sale obligation and to sell to other distributors that are willing to
pay higher prices for the product. The existence of quasi-rents
created by specific investments may cause either the upstream or
downstream firm to accept less favorable contractual terms.
Tying the licensing of the franchisor's trademark with the
purchase of the input offers a solution to downstream hold-up. By
bundling both, it is as if the franchisor has demanded that franchisees
credibly commit to a specific asset, and uses that as a "hostage" to
106. See Goldberg, supra note 83, at 754-55.
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guard itself against any future hostile actions by the franchisees.107
Exclusive dealing arrangements, together with the penalty of
violation, foreclose the opportunity for a distributor to purchase from
another manufacturer, or for a manufacturer to sell to other
distributors, and thereby raise the costs for a party who is considering
acting opportunistically. To a certain extent, such arrangements
safeguard either the upstream or the downstream firm from being
exploited by the other when market conditions change.
1°8
V. Vertical Restraints as Substitutes for Vertical Integration in
Non-Competitive Markets
As we have seen, the main functions of vertical integration in
non-competitive markets are to solve the successive monopoly
problem and to avoid inefficient substitution of inputs. The
discussion in this part follows this dichotomy. We intend to show how
various types of vertical restraints could also be used to achieve the
same goals.
A. Franchise Fee and Royalties
One of the alternatives for an upstream monopolist to solve the
successive monopoly problem is to use the franchise fee to extract
downstream monopoly profits and then sell its product at the
marginal cost to induce the downstream firm to produce or sell at the
optimal level.109 In Figure 3, for example, the upstream monopolist
could require its franchisee to pay a lump-sum franchise fee in the
amount of Pf'CGD, and then sell I at MCi. 0 To the manufacturer,
the franchise fee enables it to capture the monopoly profits that could
be owned under vertical integration. And since the franchise fee is a
fixed cost to the franchisee which is not variant with final output
level, the downstream firm will still base its output decision on its
marginal cost, MCi. As a result of this arrangement, the final price
and output level will remain at Pf' and qf'. Furthermore, the
franchise fee arrangement makes the downstream firm a "residual
107. See Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostage to Support Exchange, 73
AM. EcON. REv. 519 (1983); Katz, supra note 10, at 699.
108. See Klein, supra note 46, at 445-46; GREGG FRAsco, EXCLUSIVE DEALING 7-8
(1991).
109. The seminal work on this topic is Walter Y. Oi, A Disneyland Dilemma: Two-Part
Tariffs for a Mickey Mouse Monopoly, 85 QJ. ECON. 77 (1971).
110. This arrangement permits the manufacturer to garner the entire monopoly profit,
while allowing the retailer to earn a competitive return. In other words, the retailer does
not really go without a profit altogether. The retailer earns just enough to cover the costs
of capital and labor, and the opportunity costs of other resources used in production (e.g.,
managerial skill).
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claimant" in the sense that it will be able to appropriate any increase
in the joint profits in connection with its own promotional efforts.'
Obviously, it makes no difference in terms of their effects in
solving the successive monopoly problem and their welfare
implications whether the upstream firm uses vertical integration or
franchise fee arrangement. But the franchisee fee arrangement offers
an additional advantage, the saving of transaction costs. The
franchise fee arrangement is likely to be cheaper than vertically
integrating." 2
Alternatively, an upstream firm could sell its input to its
distributors at marginal cost, and require them to pay royalties
proportional to the total sales of the final product. By similar
analogy, marginal pricing induces the distributors to sell at the
optimal level and the royalty payment transfers the monopoly profits
at the downstream market to the manufacturer as if the product had
been distributed directly by the manufacturer."
3
The royalty solution may seem counterintuitive initially because
it has the same effect as taxing the franchisee. Standard economic
analysis indicates that a revenue tax will reduce the quantity
produced by a firm. This is indeed what happens to the franchisees
that are required to pay a royalty to the franchisor; the royalty
reduces their demand for the input supplied by the franchisor.
However, this demand reduction is precisely what the franchisor
intends, for his goal is to replicate the output-price combination that
would be achieved by an integrated monopolist.
B. Maximum Resale Price Maintenance and Territorial Restriction
For resale price maintenance to function as the equivalent of
vertical integration in solving the successive monopoly problem, the
manufacturer could sell the input according to its own profit-
maximizing price but set a maximum resale price requiring its
distributors not to sell the final product at or below a certain level.
Using Figure 3 as an illustration, the manufacturer could sell I at the
price of Pi per unit, and then set the maximum price level at Pf'. Pi
enables the manufacturer to capture the profits at the upstream
111. See TIROLE, supra note 14, at 176; Katz, supra note 10, at 664.
112. However, one caveat is necessary for this conclusion. It is based on the
assumption that the downstream firm's profits are observable, and therefore, extractable,
by the upstream firm. Once the final market demand is uncertain, two-part tariff
arrangements may impose too much risk on the downstream firm and the upstream firm
may have to adjust between the unit prices for the product and the amount of franchise fee
to achieve the same outcome. See TIROLE, supra note 14, at 176-77; G.F. Mathewson &
R.A. Winter, An Economic Theory of Vertical Restraints, 15 RAND J. ECON. 27,35 (1984).
113. See Frederick S. Inaba, Franchising: Monopoly by Contract, 47 S. ECON. J. 65, 71
(1980).
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market through monopoly pricing. On the other hand, Pf' prevents
the downstream firm from raising the final price above its marginal
cost, and reduces the downstream firm's derived demand for I as a
result. It is as if the manufacturer were facing a competitive rather
than monopolistic downstream market.
114
The use of ferritorial restrictions to avoid the successive
monopoly problem seems to be counter-intuitive. By assigning a
sales territory exclusively to a distributor, a territorial restriction
creates a monopolist at the downstream market. How, then, can
territorial protection achieve the same result as vertical integration?
The answer lies primarily in the bidding process for the exclusive
territorial right. Under the exclusive distribution relationship,
candidates will bid for the exclusive monopoly. The winning bid will
equal the expected monopoly profits that could be gained from the
chain, assuming the input is transferred at marginal cost from the
manufacturer. Again, the manufacturer is able to capture the whole
monopoly profits through the bidding process and marginal-cost
pricing by the manufacturer prevents the final output from deviating
from the optimal level.1 5
C. Tying and Output Royalty
In contrast with the solution of the successive monopoly
problem, the equivalence between tying and vertical integration, in
non-competitive markets, can be seen in the ability of both to correct
inefficient input substitution under the technology of variable-
proportions production. Similar to vertical integration, under which
the input monopolist could internally adjust to the most efficient
utilization of inputs A and B, the input monopolist could also
manipulate the relative price of A with respect to B through tying,
and thereby force the downstream firms to purchase more of A and
less of B. The input combination could therefore be brought back to
114. See TIROLE, supra note 14, at 177; CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 21, at 526.
Due to the uncertainty in market demand and the difficulty in observing the differences in
consumers' preferences, some commentators have argued that the effectiveness of using
maximum resale price maintenance to solve the successive monopoly problem may be
limited. See, e.g., Richard L. Smith II, Franchise Regulation: An Economic Analysis of
State Restrictions on Automobile Distribution, 25 J.L. & ECON. 125, 128 (1982); Katz,
supra note 10, at 676.
115. Since the more capable a distributor is, the more willing it is to outbid other
candidates, the bidding process could also increase the probability of selecting qualified
contracting partners. In addition, once the exclusive territory is authorized, it becomes a
valuable investment to the distributor. It may be more willing to cooperate with the
manufacturer regarding any change in the method of operation. See SCHERER & Ross,
supra note 69, at 558.
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the efficient ratio. 1
16
One might ask why an input monopolist would be concerned at
all over the input combination adopted by downstream firms. In
general, the input monopolist would not be concerned. But the
important feature of the tying arrangement is that it can be used by
the input monopolist to achieve the same result as forward vertical
integration, provided the input monopolist is able to tie his
monopolized good to all other input substitutes used by downstream
firms.
Analogously, an output royalty arrangement under which a
distributor is required to pay the manufacturer a proportion of the
total quantities sold in addition to the unit price can also be used to
avoid inefficient input substitution. One might view the output
royalty as a tax, t, on each unit of the final good sold by the
distributor. The supplier of input A could sell A at its marginal cost
to induce the downstream firms to use the same input combination as
that under vertical integration." 7 At the same time, it could set t
equal to the difference between the monopoly price and the marginal
cost of A to extract the downstream profits. The output royalty
arrangement does not subject the manufacturer to diminishment of its
appropriable rents from sale to the downstream market. The
incentive on the distributors' side to maintain the optimal output level
could also be preserved.
D. Policy Implications
The substantive equivalence of vertical integration and many
vertical restraints provides support for a uniform legal standard for
the vertical restraints examined in this paper. Under American
antitrust law, minimum resale price maintenance and tying
arrangements fall under the scrutiny of the more stringent per se
rule." 8 On the other hand, territorial restrictions and exclusive
dealing are reviewed under the rule of reason. But in view of their
ability to substitute for vertical integration in solving the principal-
agent dilemma or the successive monopoly problem, such
discriminatory treatment appears to be unwarranted. In particular, it
will become increasingly difficult for the Court to justify the claim
116. For a formal proof of the equivalent effect between tying and vertical integration,
see Roger Blair & David Kaserman, Vertical Integration, Tying, and Antitrust Policy, 68
AM. ECON. REV. 397,397-99 (1978).
117. See ROGER D. BLAIR & DAvID L. KASERMAN, LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND CONTROL 58-63 (1983).
118. See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408-09
(1911)(discussing minimum resale price maintenance); International Salt Co. v. United
States, 332 U.S. 392,396 (1947)(discussing tying).
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that resale price maintenance and tying arrangements seldom prove
beneficial for market competition when their substantive equivalence
to other vertical control mechanisms becomes more widely accepted.
The recent Supreme Court decision in State Oil Co. v. Khan,19
overruling the application of the per se rule to maximum resale price
maintenance 120 seems to accept this reasoning. In State Oil, a case
concerning a resale price ceiling agreement between an oil company
and gas stations, the Court said that it is difficult to maintain that
maximum resale price maintenance could harm competition to the
degree that would justify the application of the per se rule.'2' The
Court also endorsed Judge Posner's view that maximum resale price
maintenance is a means to prevent downstream monopolists from
exploiting their positions.122 In doing so, the upstream supplier is not
acting out of malice but in its own commercial interest because "[t]he
higher the price at which the gasoline is resold, the smaller the
volume sold, and so the lower the profit to the supplier if the higher
profit per gallon at the higher price is being snared by the dealer."'
1 3
VI. The Complementary Nature of Vertical Control-Toward
a Theory of Optimal Franchisingl
A. Partial Integration
The analysis so far has focused on how vertical integration
mitigates costs associated with the principal-agent dilemma, or solves
the successive monopoly problem, and how various types of vertical
restraints independently could serve the same function. The analysis
has focused on theory. In practice, we are likely to encounter hybrid
combinations of vertical control methods, especially in the business of
franchising. For example, McDonald's franchises most of its outlets
but still maintains twenty-eight percent of all its retailers as company-
owned outlets.125 Why is this necessary if vertical integration and
vertical restraints are equivalent in many respects?
We think the answer rests in large part in the firm's desire to
119. 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
120. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152-54 (1968)(establishing the
application of the per se rule to maximum resale price maintenance).
121. 522 U.S. at 15.
122. See id. at 15-16.
123. Id. (quoting Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358,1362 (7th Cir. 1996)).
124. "Optimal" refers to the minimally sufficient combinations of various types of
vertical control to maximize the vertically integrated profits. TIROLE, supra note 14, at
173; Mathewson & Winter, supra note 112, at 33.
125. Severin Borenstein & Richard Gilbert, Uncle Sam at the Gas Pump, 2
REGULATION 63, 66 (1993).
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overcome the problems of informational asymmetry and market
uncertainty.126 The validity of the claim that vertical restraints can
serve as a perfect substitute for vertical integration depends on the
availability of information concerning the demand schedule at the
downstream market. For example, the effective employment of the
"franchise fee plus marginal unit price" arrangement 27 requires that
the franchisor be able to observe the demand curve of the final good
and, consequently, the downstream monopoly profits. This is also true
of claims concerning the mutual benefits from adoption of maximum
resale price maintenance or requirement contracts. Lacking the
knowledge about consumers' reservation prices for the final goods, it
is unlikely that the upstream firm will figure out the optimal price and
output levels for the downstream firm, let alone the minimum
quantities of the inputs that the downstream firm is required to
purchase or the maximum price that it is allowed to charge its
customers. Given ever-changing market conditions, it is difficult,
perhaps impossible, for the firm to acquire this information.
In addition, market uncertainty imposes other costs on the
manufacturer who integrates downward or the distributor who
integrates upward. As Dennis Carlton has argued, the competitive
market assumption that firms can perfectly respond to any price
change and immediately adjust their output levels is usually
unattainable. 128 Decisions regarding production capacity often have
to be made before crucial market information can be verified. Once
this information is verified, capacity adjustment takes time. Full
vertical integration increases the risk that there will be more unsold
goods if market demand unexpectedly plummets. The use of partial
integration by the upstream firm is tantamount to treating the
downstream market as an insurance market for the costs of
overproduction. 2 9 That is, the manufacturer will continue to produce
by itself but simultaneously utilize its distributors to supply the extra
demand or to bear the risk of fluctuations.130
126. Aside from this consideration, partial integration offers other benefits for
managerial purpose. For example, a franchisor could use market transaction as a threat to
motivate more efficient internal production. See BESANKO ET AL., supra note 34, at 156.
Conversely, internal production provides solid protection for the upstream firm from any
hold-up by the independent suppliers. See id. However, it might create some
disadvantages as well. In particular, shared production between internal and external
units might cause coordination and monitoring costs to increase, which could result in less
efficient production. See id.
127. See text accompanying notes 99-101.
128. See Dennis Carlton, Vertical Integration in Competitive Market Under Uncertainty,
27 J. IND. EcON. 189 (1979).
129. See id. at 199.
130. See id. See also MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY 319-20 (1980).
Porter further points out that partial integration also reduces the costs arising from a lock-
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B. The Optimal Combinations of Vertical Restraints
Apart from partial integration, combinations of two or more
types of contractual restraints are more frequently observed
distribution patterns than the single use of any particular restraint.
However, the economic function of many contractual vertical
restraints still remains a new subject of inquiry for economists.
Moreover, some of the recent studies in this area appear to be limited
by their assumptions. The two studies introduced below are intended
only to provide a snapshot of the recent developments in this area.
Blair and Kaserman focus on how market uncertainty that causes
the franchisor and franchisees to place different values on the
franchise will induce the franchisor to use a "package" of contractual
restraints. 31 The essence of their argument is that since market
demand is subject to fluctuation, both the franchisor and franchisees
may apply different discount rates to calculate the franchise's net
present value. 32 This divergence in franchise value will be enlarged if
the quality of the franchisor's effort ex post to maintain the value of
the franchise (the franchisor's trademark, trade name, for example) is
taken into consideration ex ante by the franchisee. For example, if
the franchisee has little confidence in the franchisor's determination
to prevent free-riding by other franchisees, it would apply a much
higher discount rate than would be applied by the franchisor (if the
franchisor thinks otherwise). Constrained by bounded rationality
from writing a complete contract regarding the degree of effort that
should be exercised by the franchisor to avoid free-riding, this
divergence in expectations could make a mutually acceptable
franchise fee agreement unreachable.
133
The solution suggested by Blair and Kaserman is for the
franchisor to adopt both the franchise fee and output royalty
arrangements. 134 The output royalty arrangement is employed here
in relationship, and provides firms the advantage of accessing to outside R & D activities.
See id. at 320.
131. See generally Roger D. Blair & David L. Kaserman, Optimal Franchising, 48 S.
ECON. J. 494 (1982).
132. The concept of net present value is to measure the difference in value between
having a dollar at the present period and next period. Basically, to have $1 today is always
better than to have it next month. If one has $1 today, he can invest it and have more than
$1 in the next month. Therefore, to calculate the current value of having $1 next month,
one has to discount it with the investment opportunities foregone because he does not
have it today. In finance, the formula for the calculation of the net present value (NPV) is
usually written as NPV = C, + (C, + (1+r)). Namely, with the investment of C, at the
current period, one can have the payoff of C, at the next period. R is the discount rate for
C, which is offered by comparable investment alternatives. See RICHARD A. BREALY &
STEWART C. MEYER, CORPORATE FINANCE 13 (4th ed. 1991).
133. Blair & Kaserman, supra note 131, at 498.
134. See id. at 499.
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to supplement the franchise fee in dealing with the problem of
divergent discount rates and to reduce transaction costs associated
with bounded rationality.135 In a nutshell, the franchisor may have to
accept a lower franchise fee at the outset to induce the franchisee to
enter into the franchise relationship when the prospective value of the
franchise is questioned. The output royalty, on the other hand,
enables the franchisor to capture profits from the increase in sales if
the franchise later proves to be successful. Thus, the output royalty
serves as a credible signal to the franchisee that the franchisor will do
his best to protect the value of the franchise. Alternatively, even if
the discount rates applied by both parties are the same, Blair and
Kaserman note that the franchisee will still be concerned about the
probability that the franchisor might license another franchisee in the
same market after it pays the net present value of the franchise. 136
Because of market saturation, the profits that could have been gained
by the franchisee would be eliminated by competition from
newcomers. The franchise fee together with territorial restrictions or
exclusive dealing arrangements serve to deter the franchisor from
engaging in hold-up behavior, and guarantee the franchisee that it
will be able to collect the expected rents in the future. 37
Mathewson and Winter provide a dynamic model to illustrate
how the combined use of vertical restraints could be understood
within their "externality" theory.138 Their theory takes into account
downstream firms' conjectures about neighboring rivals' reactions to
price changes. 139
To begin with, consider the scenario in which a distributor
believes that its price change will be immediately matched by its
rivals. In other words, the size of the distributor's market is invariant
to its price decision.140  Under this assumption, the horizontal
externality will be non-existent because a distributor is unable to free-
ride on its adjacent rival who raises its price in order to reflect its
costs in providing the additional services or promotional efforts.
Suppose that there were no informational externality either. The
manufacturer's only concern would be the vertical externality;
namely, the effect the higher unit price the manufacturer charges for
its product would have on the distributor's incentive to provide
services or promotional effort. 141 In this situation, the manufacturer
135. See id.
136. See iel
137. See id. at 499-500.
138. See Mathewson & Winter, supra note 80.
139. For underlying assumptions see Mathewson & Winter, supra note 112, at 28-30.
140. These types of conjectures are referred to as "Loschian conjectures." Id. at 29.
141. See generally Mathewson & Winter, supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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could sell its product at marginal cost to induce sufficient provision of
required services, and then use a franchise fee arrangement or a
requirement contract to collect the downstream rents.142
What if we take the informational externality into consideration?
Since the franchisee expects that its provision of product information
will have the effect of increasing the demand for its rivals, it tends to
provide too little advertising from the perspective of the
manufacturer. Under this situation, Mathewson and Winter suggest
that the franchise fee or requirement contract plus a wholesale price
equal to the manufacturer's marginal cost will not be enough to
induce the optimal provision of information. Rather, the
manufacturer may have to lower the wholesale price below its
marginal cost to enlarge retail profits and to further enhance the
incentive to advertise the manufacturer's product.143 The addition of
a price floor agreement to the franchise fee or requirement contract
would prevent profits from being dissipated by lower resale prices
rather than providing more product information.'"
Next, assume that the conjecture at the downstream market is of
the "Nash type."'145 Under Nash conjectures, each distributor takes its
rivals' prices as given, and then sets its own pricing strategy
accordingly. In other words, each distributor assumes that its rivals'
prices are invariant to its own price changes. Given that the products
for resale are homogeneous, each distributor has an incentive to
lower its own price just a little bit below its rivals' in order to attract
more customers from other distributors, and keep lowering it until it
is equal to the distributor's marginal cost. 46 This incentive creates a
horizontal externality, from the manufacturer's perspective, which
implies the resale price may be too low to encourage the provision of
required services by the distributors.
Assume first there is no informational externality. For the
manufacturer to internalize both the vertical and horizontal
externalities, Mathewson and Winter propose two combinations of
contractual restraints. First, the manufacturer could attempt to
transform the downstream competitive environment into one in
which any price change will immediately be matched by rivals. For
example, by imposing territorial restraints on the downstream firms,
the distributors will be able to assume that their market areas will be
142. Mathewson & Winter, supra note 112, at 34,35.
143. See id. at 37.
144. See id.
145. We refer to the conjectures underlying the Nash equilibrium concept in game
theory. In a Nash equilibrium, each player, in deciding whether to continue to play a
different strategy, assumes that the other player will continue to play his current strategy.
See, e.g., PINDYcK & RUBINFELD, supra note 19, at 421.
146. See id. at 428-29.
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invariant to their own price changes and the horizontal externality
would be virtually eliminated. By adding a franchise fee arrangement
or requirement contract to the exclusive territorial protection as a
rent-collecting mechanism, the manufacturer can arrange incentives
for the distributor that closely match his own.147 The second method
is the use of minimum resale price maintenance to correct the
underpricing incentive, and then a franchise fee arrangement to
extract the downstream profits.148
A similar argument applies to the situation where the
informational externality exists. Territorial restrictions reduce the
likelihood that one retailer's advertising effort will spill over to the
benefit of another retailer. Indeed, the manufacturer could require
retailers to do only local advertising, and carry out national market
advertising on its own. Minimum resale price maintenance serves to
internalize both the horizontal and informational externalities.
Packaged with the franchise fee arrangement or requirement contract
to transfer rents up to the manufacturer, these arrangements can
come close to aligning the retailer's incentives with those of the
manufacturer.
C. Policy Implications
Since both the Blair and Mathewson studies are based on various
assumptions, it is difficult to come up with a general summary
regarding the theory of optimal franchising. With the risk of
oversimplification, however, we may tentatively conclude that
optimal franchising theory suggests that the combined use of various
vertical restraints is frequently spurred by the manufacturer's need to
balance the conflict between incentive provision and the dilution of
profits. In order to solve the free-riding problem, for example, the
upstream firm may need to grant some sort of protection to its
distributors if the costs of vertical integration are prohibitive. In the
meantime, however, these incentive-enhancing measures, such asminimum resale price maintenance, exclusive dealing, or territorial
exclusivity, simultaneously increase the downstream firm's market
power and also its ability to capture part of the profits that could have
been garnered entirely by the manufacturer. Arrangements such as
maximum resale price maintenance, the franchise fee, or the
requirements contract, on the other hand, are used together with
those protective devices to extract the enhanced downstream profits.
Part of this justification for the manufacturer's use of vertical
restraints, as a package, was recognized but rejected by the Supreme




Court in the now overruled Albrecht v. Herald Company. 49 In that
case, the Supreme Court refused to accept the Court of Appeals'
reasoning that a price ceiling for the resale of the defendant's
newspaper was necessary to protect consumers from being
overcharged by distributors who gained their monopoly power
through exclusive territorial protection. 5 0 Rather, the Court held
that the use of one type of illegal restraint to cure the pernicious
effect of another illegal restraint is impermissible.' 5 '
The analysis here indicates why the doctrinal formula adopted in
Albrecht is inconsistent with a policy that aims to enhance consumer
welfare. The State Oil Court replaced the Albrecht rule with a rule of
reason test that looks to the functions of the maximum price-fixing
restraint. 52 However, it is unclear, and too early to tell, whether one
can infer from State Oil that courts, consistent with optimal
franchising theory, will start to review all combined uses of vertical
restraints under the rule of reason standard, even when they include
restraints that are illegal per se under the current standard.
D. Some Implications for Doctrine
We have provided a large, though not exhaustive, catalog of
procompetitive theories of vertical control. Our goal, in this piece,
has been to provide a road map for courts to use in thinking through
the rule of reason issues generated in vertical restraint cases.
This analysis stakes out a middle ground between the current
approach of the law and the more radical per se legality position
suggested early on in the Chicago School analysis of vertical
restraints. 53 We have not addressed anticompetitive theories of
vertical control here. Although our arguments have implications for
the plausibility of anticompetitive theories in certain settings, we have
not attempted to provide a general refutation of anticompetitive
theories. Our goal, instead, has been to present much of the "post-
Chicago school" development in the law and economics of vertical
control. Much of this literature draws on the economic theory of the
firm and the theory of contracts.'5 4
What does this analysis imply for the law? There are many ways
to answer this, and a detailed analysis of the law is probably better
149. 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
150. See id. at 153.
151. See id.
152. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
153. See generally BORK, supra note 3; Director & Levi, supra note 3.
154. See Martin K. Perry, Vertical Integration: Determinants and Effects, in 1
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 183, 185 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert
D. Willig eds., 1989)("The theory of vertical integration is situated at the intersection of
the theory of the firm, the theory of contracts, and the theory of markets.").
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saved for another paper. However, some general conclusions can be
offered now.
First, this analysis rather obviously suggests that the rule of
reason should be applied across the board in the analysis of vertical
control mechanisms. Antitrust law seems to be approaching this
position, especially with the recent decision in State Oil, but the law
still has a long way to go.
Second, antitrust courts should focus on the functions of the
various vertical control methods in determining whether they violate
the antitrust laws. Per se analysis is inappropriate because it permits
and encourages the court to ignore the function of the vertical
restraint. More important, even if rule of reason analysis were
adopted with respect to a particular vertical control method, this
analysis suggests that it should be applied from a functional
perspective. This should be contrasted with the doctrinal perspective
generally taken by courts.
These basic lessons can be illustrated with several areas of
vertical restraint doctrine.
(1) Resale Price Maintenance
Minimum resale price maintenance remains per se unlawful.155
The Court has shown a tendency lately to raise the burden of proof
for plaintiffs in resale price maintenance cases. For example, in
Monsanto Company v. Spray-Rite Service Corporation,156 the
Supreme Court held that in order to survive a motion for summary
judgment, a terminated dealer must show something more than that
the manufacturer terminated him after receiving complaints from
other dealers. 157 In particular, under Monsanto, the plaintiff must
show some evidence of conspiracy, "evidence that tends to exclude
the possibility that the manufacturer and nonterminated distributors
were acting independently."' 5 In Business Electronics Corporation v.
Sharp Electronics Corporation59 the Court raised this burden of
proof substantially higher, perhaps beyond the reach of most
plaintiffs. The Court held in Business Electronics that an agreement
between a manufacturer and a dealer to terminate another dealer is
per se unlawful only if there is a concomitant agreement to maintain
155. The per se illegality rule was adopted in Dr. Miles Medical Company v. John D. Park
& Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408-09 (1911). The rule was modified in State Oil Company v.
Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997), bringing maximum resale price maintenance under the rule of reason
test.
156. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
157. See id. at 764.
158. Id. at764.
159. 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
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resale prices at some particular level. 16°
What explains this pattern of maintaining the rule against
minimum resale price maintenance while at the same time shifting the
burden of proof to the detriment of plaintiffs? The Court's reasoning
in both Monsanto and Business Electronics makes clear that it
recognizes that the rule of reason justifications accepted in the area of
territorial restraints (in Sylvania)161 apply to the analysis of resale
price maintenance. 62 Rather than overturn the per se rule against
resale price maintenance, the Court has taken the more conservative
path of raising the burden of proof for plaintiffs.
Our analysis makes clear, in economic terms, what is already
implicitly the message in the Court's recent cases: rule of reason
analysis should be applied both to territorial restrictions and to
vertical resale price maintenance. We take the argument a step
further, of course, and say that the rule of reason test should be
sensitive to the economic function of the restraint.
(2) Territorial Restrictions
The analysis of vertical territorial restrictions was brought under
the rule of reason in Sylvania, but even in this area of the law the
analysis tends not to focus on the economic function of the restraint.
Sylvania holds that a territorial restraint will be held reasonable if its
benefits for interbrand competition outweigh its detrimental effects
on intrabrand competition. 163 However, this doctrine appears too
narrow when viewed in light of the theories presented in this paper.
160. See i at 735-36.
161. Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36,59 (1977).
162. See Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 762-63. In Monsanto, the Court noted that:
A manufacturer and its distributors have legitimate reasons to exchange
information about the prices and the reception of their products in the market.
Moreover, it is precisely in cases in which the manufacturer attempts to further a
particular marketing strategy by means of agreements on often costly nonprice
restrictions that it will have the most interest in the distributors' resale prices.
The manufacturer often will want to ensure that its distributors earn sufficient
profit to pay for programs such as hiring and training additional salesmen or
demonstrating the technical features of the product, and will want to see that
'free-riders' do not interfere. See Sylvania [433 U.S. at 55]. Thus, the
manufacturer's strongly felt concern about resale prices does not necessarily
mean that it has done more than the Colgate doctrine allows.
Id. See also Business Electronics v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 726 (1988)("Our
approach to the question presented in the present case is guided by the premises of GTE
Sylvania and Monsanto: that there is a presumption in favor of a rule-of-reason standard; that
departure from that standard must be justified by demonstrable economic effect, such as the
facilitation of cartelizing, rather than formalistic distinctions; that interbrand competition is
the primary concern of antitrust laws; and that rules in this area should be formulated with a
view towards protecting the doctrine of GTE Sylvania.").
163. 433 U.S. at 54,58-59 (White, J., concurring).
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It suggests that a territorial restraint should be invalidated when it
provides no apparent enhancements to interbrand competition. This
is too narrow, because it is possible that a territorial restraint may
benefit consumers without substantially enhancing interbrand
competition. For example, consider the case where there is no
interbrand competition and the monopolist manufacturer uses
territorial restraints to avoid or eliminate the successive monopoly
problem. A functional approach to rule of reason analysis would
avoid applying an excessively narrow test to vertical control methods.
(3) Vertical Integration
Vertical integration doctrine-specifically, vertical merger
doctrine-remains largely dominated by the "foreclosure theory"
adopted early in du Pont.164 Of course, the Justice Department
Guidelines have moved beyond the early case law, by giving greater
scope to efficiency defenses. 165 In addition, before the premerger
notification law had the effect of freezing the development of merger
doctrine, the case law had moved substantially in the direction of
applying a rule of reason test.166 Still, the foreclosure theory remains
a starting point for antitrust attacks on vertical mergers and exclusive
dealing arrangements. 167
But foreclosure is only one of many economic effects associated
with vertical integration. And it is easy to construct an example in
which foreclosure may be desirable. Suppose a monopolist is selling
to a distributor who himself enjoys a high degree of monopoly power.
The monopolist manufacturer must worry about the "double-
marginalization" problem introduced in our discussion of successive
monopoly: the monopolist will apply a monopoly surcharge to the
item he produces, and the distributor will apply an additional
monopolistic surcharge to the same item at the downstream level.
16s
The monopolist can eliminate this problem by vertically integrating
164. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586,592 (1957). On the
continuing importance of the foreclosure theory, see, e.g., David Reiffen & Michael Vita,
Comment: Is There New Thinking on Vertical Mergers?, 63 ANTrrRUST L.J. 917, 918-19
(1995)(criticizing foreclosure theory).
165. The significant innovation in enforcement rules came in the 1984 guidelines. See
generally U.S. Dept. of Justice Merger Guidelines (1984).
166. The shift toward rule of reason analysis in vertical merger doctrine occurred
through an indirect route. The famous decision in Brown Shoe Company v. United States,
set out a truncated rule of reason test for both vertical and horizontal mergers. See Brown
Shoe, 370 U.S. 294, 328 (1962)(setting out rule of reason test for vertical mergers). Then
the Supreme Court, in United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 510-11
(1974), reinterpreted Brown Shoe in a way that made it difficult for enforcement
authorities to evade the burdensome requirements of the rule of reason test.
167. See Reiffen & Vita, supra note 164, at 917-18.
168. See text accompanying notes 64-67.
March 1999] PROCOMPETITVE THEORIES
forward, and transferring his own products at marginal cost to the
downstream segment of the integrated unit. In this example, the
monopolist gains, and so do consumers. Note also that because the
downstream distributor was assumed initially to have monopoly
power, this case may involve a high risk of foreclosure, because the
downstream segment of the integrated unit may focus on selling only
the monopolist's product.
Further, given the horizontal externalities observed in
manufacturer-distributor relationships, vertical integration and
exclusive dealing should be seen as potential solutions to these
problems. Foreclosure of competitors may result in these cases, but
consumers gain to the extent vertical control enhances the provision
of services at the downstream level.
(4) The Tying Doctrine
Tying analysis in vertical settings is still controlled by a partial
per se rule, initially set out in full in Northern Pacific Railway
Company v. United States.
169
The per se rule applies "whenever a party has sufficient
economic power with respect to the tying product to appreciably
restrain free competition in the market for the tied product and a 'not
insubstantial' amount of interstate commerce is affected.'
170
The Court has made no effort to distinguish tying as a vertical
control mechanism from other cases of tying. As a vertical control
mechanism, one should feel somewhat safer in assuming that the
consumer misperception issues are for the most part unimportant,
171
because people who make a business of dealing with products are
likely to be well informed about the items they buy and sell.
We have emphasized two potential functions for tying as a
vertical control mechanism: (1) tying may be used by an upstream
manufacturer to protect a product's reputation by preventing free-
riding by distributors, or (2) tying might be used by an input
monopolist to prevent a downstream firm from substituting away
from the monopolized input.
In the former case, consumers are likely to benefit from the
169. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
170. Id. at 6. See also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,
461-62 (1992); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9-10 (1984); Fortner
Enter., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495,497-99 (1969).
171. On consumer misperception as a basis for applying antitrust law to tying, see
Richard Craswell, Tying Requirements in Competitive Markets: The Consumer Protection
Issues, 62 B.U. L. REv. 661 (1982). Craswell's point is that tying may be both harmful to
consumers and profitable for the firm in a competitive market in which consumers lack
sufficient information to tell whether the tied (or tying) product's price exceeds the
competitive level.
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prevention of free-riding at the downstream level.172 This function
should be taken into account in tying analysis.
173
Consider the case in which tying is used by the input monopolist
to prevent substitution at the downstream level. It is fair to describe
this as a case in which tying is used to enhance monopoly power.174 In
the extreme case in which the input monopolist ties the monopolized
input to all of the potential input substitutes, the input monopolist can
replicate the outcome under vertical integration. 175 However, this
extreme is unlikely to be observed. The more likely result is that the
input monopolist will be able to reduce without completely
eliminating the downstream firm's power to substitute away from the
monopolized input. Society loses to the extent tying increases the
monopoly power of the input monopolist. However, social welfare
improves to the extent the allocation of productive inputs remains
closer to the cost-minimizing combination. Thus, even in the case in
which tying is used in a vertical setting solely to enhance monopoly
power, there may be offsetting welfare gains (as the sum of
consumers and producers surplus) that should be taken into
account.1
76
As this brief discussion shows, antitrust case law has not
developed the appropriate degree of sensitivity to the functions of
vertical control mechanisms. Scanning across vertical merger and
vertical restraint doctrine, as we have here, one sees a variety of per
se and rule of reason doctrines, with few if any of them encouraging a
careful review of the function of the relevant vertical control
172. It is not certain, of course, that consumers will always benefit. Whether tying for
the purpose of preventing free-riding benefits consumers depends on the extent to which
consumers benefit by the provision of better services. In some settings, the marginal
benefits of enhanced service-provision may be greater than its costs. See F. M. SCHERER
& DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
542-48 (3d ed. 1990). However, competition should lead firms to offer enhanced service-
provision in those markets in which the consumer benefits are large.
173. For an argument for applying rule of reason analysis to tying that is consistent with
this theory, see Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 40-42
(1984)(O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor's concurrence argues that
coordination problems and the need to prevent free-riding justify the hospital's decision to
close its anesthesiology department.
174. On the general question whether certain vertical control methods can actually
enhance monopoly power, see Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through
Leverage, 85 CoLuM. L. REV. 515 (1985)(contending that tying can enhance monopoly
power), and Ward S. Bowman Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67
YALE L.J. 19 (1957)(contending that tying cannot enhance monopoly power).
175. See generally Blair & Kaserman, supra note 116.
176. Williamson has argued that efficiency gains should be taken into account in merger
cases. See Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare
Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968). A similar welfare-tradeoff analysis can be
applied to tying in the monopoly-enhancement case.
March 1999] PRO COMPETITIVE THEORIES
mechanism. These rules must be replaced with a functionally
oriented, rule of reason analysis if there is to be any hope for the
courts giving careful consideration to the arguments presented in this
article.
Conclusion
In this article, we have surveyed procompetitive theories of
vertical control, under a taxonomy of market structures. We hope
this approach will provide courts and enforcement agencies with a
clear analytical path to follow in evaluating the competitive impact of
various vertical control mechanisms, whether vertical integration or
vertical restraints. In particular, by using, as we have, market
structure as a starting point, we hope courts will find it easier to
prioritize relevant factors.
We have also devoted a substantial part of this paper to
demonstrating the functional equivalence of vertical integration and
various vertical restraints in reducing costs associated with the
principal-agent and successive monopoly problems, and we have
demonstrated the complementary roles that vertical control
mechanisms play in supplementing each other in an optimal
distribution scheme. These arguments suggest that courts should
reconsider the validity of applying different legal standards to
different types of vertical restraints, and replace rigid doctrinal
categories with a functionally oriented, rule of reason analysis.
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Appendix
I. Vertical Integration and Variable-Proportions Productions
In this section, we elaborate on the argument of Part III.D of the
text. As Figure 4 and the accompanying analysis will show, the use of
vertical integration under variable proportions production could









Suppose a competitive final market in the final product is
composed of two inputs, A and B. Assume also that input market A
is monopolized and input B is competitively supplied. The curve Iq in
Figure 4 shows all the possible combinations of input A and B with
their given prices that will yield the same industry output, Q. In a
similar vein, the line cd represents the various combinations of both
inputs with their given prices that will generate the same total
production costs, and, therefore, could be understood as the budget
constraint on the production of Q.178 The other aspect of the segment
cd is that point c on the vertical axis represents the maximum quantity
177. The diagram and analysis is drawn from John M. Vernon & Daniel A. Graham,
Profitability of Monopolization by Vertical Integration, 79 J. POL. ECON. 924 (1971). See
also SHUGHART, supra note 57, at 321-24; BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 117, at 48-50;
SCHERER & Ross, supra note 69, at 522-27.
178. In economic parlance, Iq and cd are called respectively the "isoquant" and
"isocost" curves. See PARKIN, supra note 17, at 260,263-64.
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of B that could be purchased if the downstream firm spends all of its
budget on B. Hence, the total costs of production can also be
expressed as the marginal cost of B times c.
With Iq and the budget restraint of cd, the cost-efficient way of
using these two inputs will occur at the point q, where cd is tangential
to Iq. To see the result, compare point q' on Iq with q.1
79 It is
obvious from Figure 4 that q' lies above the line segment cd. It means
that the cost of using the input combination q', represented by the
cost line c'd', to produce Q is higher than that of q. Indeed, given the
shape of Iq, this observation holds for all points other than q on Iq.
In order to examine how vertical integration will affect the
production mode, let us start hypothetically with the case where both
A and B are competitively supplied. To avoid unnecessary
complications, suppose that c'd' is the line of budget constraint under
this circumstance and, similarly, could be expressed as the marginal
cost of B times c'. As the price of B remains unchanged, the
difference between c and c' is solely an outcome resulting from the
change in the pricing pattern at market A. That is, it represents the
increase of profits that could have been appropriated by the
monopolist had it sold A at its marginal cost. This provides an
incentive for the input monopolist to integrate forward to the
downstream market. Suppose that the monopolist acquires all
downstream firms and then transfers input A internally to its
downstream division at the competitive price. If the integrated firm
decides to maintain the output level at Q, what input combination will
it select? Although point q is on c'd' and, therefore, is within the
firm's budget constraint, it is not the least costly input combination
for the integrated firm. Rather, holding constant the price ratio
between the now competitively supplied A and B, one can find a new
curve c"d" that is tangential to Iq at q" in Figure 4 and represents a
lower cost of production. Also, with the cost curve of c"d", vertical
integration enlarges the monopolist's profits by the amount of c-c".
In this example, vertical integration increases the monopolist's power,
harming consumers. However, total welfare increases because the
integrated unit adopts the cost-minimizing input combination.
H. Vertical Control in Non-Competitive Markets: The Case of
Monopsony
This analysis has focused on the assumption of an upstream
monopoly. In a monopsonistic market, in which the downstream firm
is the sole buyer of the upstream intermediate input, there is a strong
economic incentive for the monopsonist to integrate backward. To
179. See id. at 266.
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demonstrate this potential, Figure 5 graphically illustrates a simple








Suppose that the market for input supply is competitive and the
demand for the input is controlled by a single buyer with a demand
schedule D. For the monopsonist, D reflects the extra revenue from
selling the final good produced by the last unit of input purchased,
and is technically called the marginal revenue product curve
("MRP"). 181 With an upward-sloping input supply curve Si, the
marginal cost for the monopsonist to use one extra unit of the input,
represented by MCf in Figure 5, must lie above Si. The reason is that
the monopsonist has to pay a higher price for all units of input rather
than only one more unit if it wishes to purchase that one additional
unit. To further clarify this point, consider a hypothetical example in
which a tobacco producer in an isolated small town hires all the
residents who wish to work for the company. Assume that the
producer currently hires 10 workers at the wage of $10 per day. If the
wage information is available to every employee, the producer will
not be able to hire another worker and pay him $11 without
increasing the other employees' wages. In other words, in order to
hire an extra worker, the producer has to pay $11 for the eleventh
worker plus a one-dollar increase for each of the workers previously
hired. The marginal cost for using the extra unit of input in this case
180. See ROGER D. BLAIR & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, MONOPSONY 36-42 (1993);
SHUGHART, supra note 57, at 325-27; CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 21, at 152.
Linear input supply curve and marginal cost curve are assumed in this model.
181. See PARKIN, supra note 17, at 413; BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 180, at 39 n.7.
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will be $21 which is greater than the price for that unit $11.18
With similar profit-maximizing objectives as that of a
monopolist, the monopsonist chooses to purchase q1 units of the
input where its MRP is equal to MCf. However, at q1, the
monopsonist actually pays for the input according to Si, which yields a
price for the input of P3. The profits that could be earned from
selling the output generated by q1 unit of input could be measured by
the area of PIP3ca. Comparing the price and output levels when the
input is competitively demanded, P2 and q2, the monopsonist
purchases less and, therefore, sells less. From the standpoint of
society, the monopsonist's exercise of its buying power creates a
deadweight loss that is equivalent to the area abc.
From this setup, we can also observe that there is an incentive for
the monopsonist to integrate backward to the upstream industry.
Suppose that the monopsonist acquires the upstream industry and,
accordingly, all resource allocation regarding the production of the
final good is now determined internally. The monopsonist under this
circumstance no longer has to worry about the increase in marginal
cost in connection with the increased use of the input. Rather, it
could price discriminate against the input suppliers. Namely, it could
pay each additional unit of input according to the price schedule on Si
without the need to pay all previous units the same higher prices.
Hence, MCf becomes irrelevant for the monopsonist's purchase
decision. The monopsonist now will expand its use of the input up to
the new equilibrium level q2, where its new marginal cost curve Si is
equal to MRP. Given that the average cost of using q2 is P4, which is
the corresponding point on the monopsonist's average cost curve
ACi, 183 the monopsonist could earn a total profit of PlP4db, which is
obviously larger than that before vertical integration. It also
eliminates the deadweight loss by raising the final output level to the
level attained when no monopsony had existed. In turn, consumers
stand to gain by paying lower prices for the final goods.184
182. More formally, let TC be the monoposonist's total cost of labor. W(l) is the labor
supply function. By definition, we have
TCt= W(l)*l.
Differentiate Tq with respect to 1 yields the monoposonist's marginal cost of labor which
is greater than W(l). Namely,
dC___ =W() I (l)*l > 0 if W' () > 0 if W' () > O.
dl
183. To see how AC, lies below S, intuitively, imagine a class of 50 students with the
average test score of 50. In order to raise the average test score to 51, the fifty-first
student has to score more than 51 to achieve that goal.
184. See SHUGHART, supra note 57, at 327; BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 9, at 309-
11; see also Perry, Vertical Integration: The Monopsony Case, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 561
(1978).
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HI. The Successive Monopoly Problem
Here we present a simple mathematical description of the
successive monopoly problem, and potential solutions. Suppose an
upstream manufacturer sells all of its output through downstream
retailers. Let the upstream cost function be C. = c. qu, and the
downstream cost function be Cd = cd %d. Downstream inverse demand
is Pd = ad - c; upstream, it is p. = a. - qu; ad> a .
The downstream firm maximizes profit, given the wholesale
price, p., charged by the upstream firm. This generates a "derived
demand" for the upstream firm's product. Suppose the upstream
market is competitive and the downstream market is monopolized.
The profit maximizing quantity choice for the downstream firm will
be q = (ad - cd)/2 = (ad - pu)/2. (To see this, set marginal revenue, (ad -
qc) - qh, equal to marginal cost, cd, and solve for q.) And the
downstream price will be pd = (ad + p)/2.
The upstream firm, which is competitive, will face a market price
p = c u, and will therefore sell to meet the downstream demand (ad -
pu)/ 2 , and this implies pu = cu, qu = (ad - cu)/2.
Now suppose the upstream market is monopolized, as well as the
downstream market. The downstream firm chooses qma = (ad - cd)/2 =
(ad - pu)/2, and pm = (ad + cd)/2 = (ad + pu)/2. The upstream firm now
chooses a price and quantity combination that maximizes ir = (pu -
c,)((ad - pu)/ 2). This yields the combination pmu = (ad + cu)/2, qu = (ad -
cj/4.
These results show that the "double-marginalization" that occurs
in the "monopoly-monopoly" scenario leads to considerably higher
prices and lower quantity for consumers. Under the "competitive
upstream-monopoly downstream" case, the ultimate price-quantity
combination given to end-use consumers is p d = (ad + cu)/2, qd = (ad -
cu)/2. This is the combination that would be chosen by an integrated
monopolist. Under the monopoly-monopoly setting, the price-
quantity combination facing end-use consumers is pm, = (3 ad + c)/4,
qd = (ad - cu)/4. The total welfare loss to consumers in moving from
the "competition-monopoly" to the "monopoly-monopoly" case is
given by (1/2)(Ap)(Aq) where Ap is the change in price, Aq is the
change in quantity. The loss in consumer welfare is therefore (1/8) (ad
- c,,)2.
The upstream firm would improve its position by selling its good
at marginal cost to the downstream retailer, and charging a fixed fee
for the service. Under monopoly-monopoly, the upstream firm's
profit is equal to (1/8)(ad - cU) 2. If the upstream firm were to charge a
fixed fee to the downstream retailer, it could expropriate the
downstream firm's profit. Thus, the upstream firm can charge any
fixed (say, per-year) fee, F, such that F (Pd - cd)((ad - C.)/2) = (1/4)(ad
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_ %)2. Thus, consumer welfare can be enhanced and the profits of the
upstream firm enhanced through vertical integration, or through a
relationship in which the upstream firm sells at marginal cost and
charges a fixed franchise fee to the downstream retailer.
Let us consider the related issue of rent-extraction by an
upstream monopolist. Suppose the upstream market is monopolized
and the downstream market is competitive. The quantity produced
by downstream firms is therefore q, = ad - cd = ad - pu. The
downstream price is pd = Pu.
The upstream monopolist will maximize its profits, taking into
consideration the actions of the downstream firms. Thus, the
upstream monopolist will set Pu in order to maximize 7; = (p. - cu) (ad -
pu). Setting marginal revenue (in price), ad - 2pu, equal to marginal
cost, c., yields the solution pm = (ad + c.)/ 2, qm, = (ad - c,)/ 2. This
shows that the upstream monopolist can extract the full monopoly
profit from end-use consumers by charging appropriately high prices
to the downstream retailers.
IV. Externalities in the Manufacture-Distribution Relationship
Now suppose the downstream firm's sales depend to some extent
on effort invested into promotion and advertising. If the upstream
firm integrated forward, it would try to maximize (Pd - e - c.)qi(e)
where i denotes the sales of a particular retailer, and e represents
effort. In the non-integrated setting, however, the retailer maximizes
(Pd - e - p.) %.(e). Clearly, if p. > c, the retailer will choose a different
level of e than that chosen by the integrated manufacturer.
Assume for now that there is only one retailer. The marginal
benefit from effort for the retailer is (Pd - e - p.)q'(e), where q'(e)
represents the derivative of q with respect to e. The marginal benefit
for the integrated manufacturer is (Pd - e - c.) q'(e). Since (Pd - e - c.)
q'(e) > (Pd - e - pu) q'(e), and since marginal cost of effort is the same
and equal to one for both, the retailer chooses too little effort from the
manufacturer's perspective. This is the vertical externality, described
by Mathewson and Winter.
Now suppose these are two retailers. For the individual retailer,
the marginal benefit of effort is (Pd - e - pu)(Oq, / ae,). For the
manufacturer, the marginal benefit is (Pd - e - c) (aq, / ae + aqh / ae1).
As long as aqh / ae, > 0, the manufacturer will prefer greater effort
than will the retailer. The captures the spillover externality.
The third externality results from sales by discounters. The
manufacturer gains even when a discounter sells his product, but the
retailer gets nothing. Hence, it should be clear, the retailer's
incentive to invest effort is pushed, by this effect, further below that
of the manufacturer.
[Vol. so
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Now consider the possibility that the retailer could increase his
individual sales by reducing Pd, The manufacturer determines the
level of effort that maximizes (Pd - e - c.)q(e, Pd). Let that level be e*.
However, the retailer may choose to increase his own sales by
reducing Pd and setting e < e*. Resale price maintenance allows the
manufacturer to control this incentive. By setting a price floor P d = e*
+ p., the manufacturer can induce the retailer to choose e = e, and
competition will lead the retailer to choose P, = Pf,"

